'PRINCIPAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO PERSIA CONNECTED WITH THE SUMMARY OF EVENTS AND MEASURES OF VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDDLESTON IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. JANUARY 1899 TO NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV-PART IV. PERSIA.' [‎59r] (122/136)

already spoken to the Ain-ed-Dowleh, the head of the new Ministry in Persia,
in general terms somewhat to the above effect. Put the knowledge of the
Persian Government is a very different thing from the knowledge of the
Russian Government: and it appears to us, if the policy that we recommend
finds favour with His Majesty’s Government, that its first condition, and
the most effective guarantee that it will not be required to take practical
shape in circumstances of international complication, will he that the
Russian Government should he clearly informed of the action that our reiterated
pledges to uphold t he integrity of Persia will compel us, in certain contingencies,
to take. We even think that the knowledge that Great Britain is thus prepared
to resist the destruction of the independence of Persia might predispose the
Russians to enter upon a discussion with ,us as to the sole means, apart from
artificial resorts, by which that independence can be permanently maintained,
namely, financial and administrative reform.
12. We now pass to an examination of the wider issue that would be raised
by an invasion in force of the whole of Northern Persia by the Russian arms. In
such a case we think that our reply is equally clear. We would retaliate by the
occupation of Seistan and of the port and islands of Bunder Abbas. We would
land a British force at Bushire for the protection of British interests and the
support of constituted authority there. We would do the same at Moham-
merah in support of the authority of the Sheikh, who, there can be little doubt,
would welcome our appearance. In all these places we would explain that we
came to save the country from disruption and to vindicate the existing order.
At Mohammerah it would be for consideration whether our commercial or
political interests on the Karun River required the despatch of British troops
to Ahwaz or Shushter. We would, however, most certainly not leave out of
sight this most valuable corner of the Persian dominions, both because of its
intrinsic importance, because of the known sympathies of its Chiefs and people
with the British cause, and because, if we leave the field open, others will
not fail to enter it,
13.. There remains the question raised by Sir A. Hardinge, whether the
occupation of Mohammerah and the Karun River should be followed by a military
advance upon Isfahan. We think that the answer to this question must depend
upon two contingencies, on neither of which is it possible to pronounce with any
exactitude at the present time. A good deal would turn upon the personality
and action of the Persian prince or official who happened to be Governor of
Isfahan. Were the present Governor, the Zil-es-Sultan, who is the elder brother
of the Shah, and has well-known British sympathies, to be in office, and were
British or Indian troops to appear upon the Karun, we think it extremely likely
that he would press us to send a contingent to Isfahan for his support.
Given a strong Governor at Isfahan, and the existence of conditions in which
our presence would be welcomed by the people, we think that such an invita
tion might be deserving of consideration. The appearance of British troops at
Isfahan would certainly do more than any other step that can be contemplated
to convince the Persians that we were in earnest in desiring a return to the
status quo ante, and that Great Britain had to be reckoned with as well as
Russia in the future disposition of the country. Neither can we think
that the situation is at all likely to be realised that has been contemplated
in some of the papers, viz., that at such a moment, when British forces would
be in occupation of Seistan, the mouth of the Gulf, Bushire, Mohammerah,
and Isfahan, the Russians would issue an ultimatum to us to retire from the
latter place. Por in such a case, whatever might be her prospective triumphs
on land, Russia would be compelled to forego all hopes of satisfying her ambitions
with regard to the sea. But there is a further contingency upon which, even
more than upon the personality or inclinations of the Governor of Isfahan for
the time being,we think that the answer to the question must depend. This
is the degree of confidence that we might repose in, and the extent of
assistance that we might hope to receive from, the tribes occupying the belt
of country to the west and north-west of Isfahan. If the Bakhtiaris, Lurs,
and other tribes in that neighbourhood had in the interim composed their
internecine feuds, if we had been able, by means of levies or road guards upon
the Bakhtiari (Ahwaz-Isfahan) and Luristan (Dizf ul-K horremabad) roads, to