‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [‎76r] (150/949)

5
Probably 25,000* tons of grain = about 6 wagons per diem, would
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considerable quantity of which must be consumed lUg. An excellent claSS of Cotton
is grown in Bokhara, and the
annum, a
locally.
Russians are introducing its cultivation along the Trans-Caspian Railway. It
is in this direction that the land and water of Seistan might be utilised to the
fullest advantage. There is land in sufficiency, the soil is good, and the climate
similar to that of Central Asia; while the normal discharge of the Helmand is
not less than that of the Jhelum canal, say, 3,000 to 4,000 cubic feet per
second.
Commercially speaking, should the country ever become ours, a railway to
the Helmand and Seistan might almost rank with our Punjab Canal Railways
as a paying scheme.
Under existing circumstances, it is fruitless to consider the subject in any
other light than that of a possible strategic railway, and then, for reasons which
will be subsequently stated, it is possibly a less effectual weapon than a flanking
line along the trade route. That point I leave to the military authorities^
merely adding that a further obvious consideration is that we can proceed with
the latter scheme, which is in our own territory, and not with the former.
It is not my province to discuss the comparative advantages and disadvan
tages of going out across a desert to meet an enemy, instead of leaving him
the enormous task of coming to attack us; nor am I in a position to speak
of the opportunity that a rail head near Seistan affords for checkmatin 0 *
hostile designs on the Gulf; but there is one point on the route now described
which deserves the attention of the military authorities. A reference to the
map will show that, so far as a direct attack on Nushki from the direction of
the Helmand is concerned, Galur must be a strategic position of first class
importance.
Situated as it is at the head of the Gazi Chah and Umbai Passes, with
the almost impassable Registan on one hand, and on the other the equally
impassable mass of the Chageh mountains, an invader must make it his
objective, not merely for these reasons, but because of its abundant water-
supply in the shallow wells of Safai, Galur, and Shah Ismail Ziarat.
t It will be seen that a practically surface line about 80 miles in length,
entirely inside our own border, would land our forces within a day’s march of
this spot, whence flying columns could stop all attempts to cross the desert
from the Helmand (unless they were supported by a railway), by filling up
the wells, and disputing every water hole with the enemy’s advance parties.
Por the desert could not be crossed even by a moderate force, in the face of
any opposition, until detachments had held and cleared out all the water holes
along the various caravan roads centering on Galur.
If ever, therefore, we are caught with our frontier defences incomplete,
and an attack threatening Nushki, it would seem that the construction of this
80 miles of light line might be put in hand with advantage, either direct from
Nushki, or as a branch from the Nushki-Seistan Railway.
Bridging .—Should it be desirable to cross the Helmand and proceed in
the direction of Herat, several good sites will be obtainable between Bund
Kamal Khan and Chahar Burjak. The river bottom there is coarse shingle
and hard sand, almost amounting to soft sandstone; whereas lower down it is
alluvial silt and sand. The length of the bridge would be about 1,200 feet.
Probably 60 feet spans on wrought iron cylinders filled with concrete would be
the most economical design; but open foundation might be possible.
The low water depth of the river is in many places not more than 2 feet
or 2 feet 6 inches, and the current, except in flood, is quite moderate. Sand-bag
cofferdams or islands could very easily be made according to the style of
foundations adopted.