‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [‎83r] (164/949)

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[Confidential.]
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Reconnaissance from Kondi on the Seistan Trade Route via Mashkhel-
Hamnn and Panjgnr to—
{a) Karachi ... ... ... 556 miles.
(£>) Pasni {via Nag Kalat) ... ... 424 „
(c) Pasni {via Kathag Pass) ... ... 404 „
General .—The necessity for a connection between the Nushki-Seistan
Railway and the coast may he urged on three grounds, each of sufficient
importance to justify a thorough discussion of the subject.
The first is purely a traffic argument, which is that, if circumstances
should ever require us to carry on simultaneous campaigns at the Khojak and
Seistan, the existing lines to Quetta would be unable to meet the strain. The
point need not be discussed here at length; many may differ from this opinion ;
hut it should he remembered in estimating the carrying capacity of our
frontier system, that no reliance should he placed on the Sind-Pishin State
Railway, and that both it and the Mushkaf-Bolan State Railway will be liable
to temporary interruptions of traffic through breaches in pipe lines, and
damage to bridges or tunnels, the acts of local malcontents, possibly instigated
by our enemies.
We should be unwarrantably sanguine in expecting that the actual
performance of these railways in time of war, with the possibility of slips at
Mud Gorge, and breaks at any point, would ever be more than a moderate
fraction of that shown in a working Time Table, compiled on the hypothesis
that everything runs as smoothly in war as in peace.
The second is a strategic argument, and has been mentioned in the report
of the Nushki-Seistan Railway, namely, the advantage of a second line of
advance and retreat, and of a second base of supplies for an army operating
near Seistan. There is scarcely room for a difference of opinion on this point.
A reference to the map shows how hazardous (without this stiffener) any large
movements would be, say, at Robat, the end of a long unsupported line, parallel
throughout its length to a possibly hostile frontier; and how the defence of
the railway might, under certain circumstances, consume a large proportion of
our forces.
Finally, there is the desirability of defending the Makran frontier against
any possibility of invasion from the west, and of strengthening our hold on
that country. Though these objects appear different, it will be seen hereafter
that they really merge into one another. Speaking from the point of view of a
mere traveller, there can be no denying the fact that our status in Western
Baluchistan is far from satisfactory, the inhabitants are obsessed by Russia
to an almost incredible degree. Every day I heard some new and absurd
rumour of her movements. That an army had assembled at Jalk, that three
Russian transports had arrived in Karachi, with twelve, eight, and six thousand
troops on board, who had disembarked, and were advancing to the conquest of
India; and so on. The foundation of fact for the last was probably the arrival
in Karachi of a Russian man-of-war. A solitary Russian traveller was some
where in the neighbourhood of Jalk. Childish as are these rumours, they show
that our strength is little known. and respected, and that our approaching
defeat by Russia is looked on as inevitable.
We no longer keep a British officer in the country as an outward sign of
our authority, and were the Russians to post a smart Consul on our Makran
frontier, the influence he might obtain over our Baluch tribes would have very
serious consequences. Even granting that an invasion in force by way of
Makran need scarcely be thought of for many years to come, a very awkward
diversion might be made in that quarter, by small forces advancing up the Kech
and Panjgur valleys, well supplied with money and rifles for distribution
among the tribesmen. A rising thus fomented might assume dangerous pro
portions, and extend to the tribes near Kalat.