‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [‎106v] (211/949)

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Dated Seistan, the 25 th May 1903 .
From— Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan
Arbitration Commission,
To—D. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign
Department.
Our telegrams lately have an appearance of being somewhat at cross purposes, but this is
hardly avoidable when communications take so long in reaching each other.
I trust that nothing I have telegraphed so far has been interpreted as a wish on my part
to hurry out of this country before our work has been completed. I was obliged, however, to
look at both aspects of the question, and gave you the means of withdrawing us at an early
date at the risk of scamping work here, if such were the wish of Government, or of keeping us
here till the work is thoroughly completed. The last portion of my first telegram on the
subject (No. 328 of 27 th April) would not have been sent, if I had then been in receipt of your
telegram (Viceroy’s Camp, 21 st April). My last telegram, i.e. y No. 343 of 23 rd May, places,
I am afraid, the chances of our early return altogether out of the question.
I say afraid, because although from the first I saw little or no chance of getting away,
yet the prospects of a long, severe, and very trying summer in this singularly unpleasant country
are far from invigorating. Yes, under existing conditions, it is a very unpleasant country for
a summer in camp. Public opinion is divided as to whether the heat, the insects, or the wind
is the worst evil. I’m inclined to think the wind, though unpleasant in itself, is a blessing
in disguise, for it defeats the first two evils. Whether our tents will stand it remains to be
seen. We have also to learn whether the Seistan fly will kill our horses and camels, in the
autumn, as the people maintain it will. The Akhundzada says the fly has died out much of
late years, and that he only loses a few horses yearly from it, but perhaps this year’s floods
may resuscitate the beast.
The mosquitoes have already killed one of our camels.
If all had gone on as I had planned, I would have given my award on the boundary line
about the 20 th of April, and would have proceeded to demarcate necessary portions of the line,
* wou ^ liave ta ^ en U P the water question. Two causes have upset this plan!
The first was that I found at the last moment how wrong existing surveys are of the country
between Takht-i-bhah and Siah Koh. Takht-i-Shah we had already found to be on a long spit
j c m . a . a . runn i n g northwards into the Naizar, and therefore, in accordance with Goldsmid’s
definition, in Persian territory. A straight line from there to Siah Koh seemed simple enough
but we discovered an inconvenient long spit of mainland some way to the west of Takht-i-Shah
running southwards from the Afghan shore into the Naizar. It was doubtful whether the
straight line would cut this spit or not, and to settle this point one had first definitely to
verity the position of Siah Koh, which you will have seen I had some difficulty in doing'. The
straight line will work out all right I think, but the map is not yet quite finished.
Ihe second cause was the unexpected continuation of the rising of the Helmand River.
I is has put most of the area which especially needs demarcation under water, and made
actual demarcation impossible. Moreover, the swollen Helmand has shown signs of fresh
vagaries, and it looks as though the Nadali channel and some of the canals on the Afghan
f g I TTT 1 . 111 rel ? tive Size ’ This ma y have ^ a ^ered pre-exis & ting
conditions of water distribution, and a settlement of water questions is hung up until the river
drops low enough to let us see what changes have actually occurred.
As soon as the probabilities of a prolongation of our work began to grow into certainties
shouWerT This ft ^ res P 0DS ibility for delay as much as possible on to Persian
to ge^p-per ttaTtionT ^ ^ ^ 1 am at Wait '' D S f ° r ‘»em
T J ther f . h 7 ha, ' e even yet woke U P U the P ros l» ct °f our staying on here indefinitely
inndering Igaiu ’ n ^ ^ d “ - until too late to prevent S
He and the Yamm were so cock-sure that I was just going to finish up here and oo
Ti st°ar t to Ja rt„ b0rder ’ t , that | M,I,e ? haS C0 " eCted ca “ els - d announced his in”nti£
of starting for a tour southwards and on to Kerman, evidently timed to coincide with
our migration to Mirjawa. I am curious to see if he will adhere to his tour if we don't
move. I am sorry for Miller, as his leave and, I hear, promotion too, are hun- up until
the completion of this Mission. Disappointment may lead to more display of tempef on his
SrLUo'inThfse Zts^f^wr 6 ’ 0 " 1 " 050 " 815 ' 1 s,a y, here can ’‘ but be a blow to Russlan
t ?<r ’ for , we , are ver y inconveniently « evidence here in every wav and
not in one part of Seistau only, but all over it and round it. Our officers wander promTsTu’ouslv
the Afghan a whIe n ou? offiM Sh f ° n Birjand ^ an,i Lash Jo " ain and ^akansur on
nnrfo^f q / uf of p clal s and men are more or less in quiet occupation of all the im-
Ld U aSeS ’ C0 eCtlDg grain ’ S rindin g flour > directing labour, controlling firms
and to all outward appearance running the country. The country, too, seems to like ft which
of “fheTuTsifn Cons J 6 For tT^ ^ “ ? bamS , Sbah tha “‘h" ^ wkat had Come
m Mil . 7 . i “ r 1 tlu! P ast i"' 0 fears, he said, one heard nothing but Mr. Miller
this and Mr. Miller that, while now-a-days no one ever hears his name 1