‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [‎107v] (213/949)

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danger that faces Persia is that the Afghans, unaided, can themselves effect results practical T
ruining Persian Seistan. To what extent the threat of this possibility would be premat. re
or safe before a necessary understanding is come to with Afghanistan is a matter for careful
consideration.
********
From Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., No. 909 (Secret), dated the 13th (received
27th) July 1903.
Submits, with remarks, a report {with enclosures) on the question of controlling the water of
the Helmand and irrigating the whole delta of that river*
From Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., No. 911 (Secret), dated the 15th (received
27th) July 1903.
With reference to the foregoing Utter, makes certain remarks on the political aspects of the
situation which present themselves in considering the possibility or accomplishment of
the control of the Helmand River.
Telegram from Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., No. 399, dated the 22nd
(received 27th) July 1903.
With reference to the foregoing letter, says that the Yamin-i-Nizam has incidentally intimated
that Persia contemplates offering assistance to the Afghans in making the Tarakun
canal, on certain conditions. Remarks that this contingency was not anticipated by him
in the above letter, and that the scheme would not work in practice.
Telegram to Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., No. 2177 F., dated the 29th July
1903.
Acknowledges receipt of his letters Nos. 909 and 911 , with enclosures, including maps and
plans {10 in all).
The papers now submitted fully bear out the ideas, which Colonel McMahon was asked to
investigate of the potentialities of irrigation in Seistan from the Helmand, and of ruining
Seistan by a diversion of the Helmand into the Gaud-i-Zirreh. The detailed report supports
J the conclusions at which Colonel McMahon
Page l of notes. arrived in his demi-official of 16 th April. If
Your Excellency reads his secret letter No. 911 of 15 th July with the traciog of the J survey
mao the case is very clear. My forecast of 2 , 000,000 acres of irrigated crops in the two harvests
is more than borne out. At present only some 75,000 acres of crops are irrigated, of which
50,000 acres are in Persian and 25,000 acres are in Afghan Seistan.
All that is required is a weir at Band-i-Kamal Khan or somewhere just above this to raise
the water level 10 feet at the heads of the proposed canals.
To divert the Helmand into the Gaud-i-Zirreh when the water is most required for sowings
is an infinitely simple matter. A temporary dam at this point with a cutting near Kala-i-Atzal,
four miles long and from 10 to 20 feet deep in earth, would do all that is required. It is clear
that any Power having control of the Helmand at Band-i-Kamal Khan can at will convert
Seistan into the granary of Eastern Persia and of Southern Afghanistan and of Baluchistan,
or into a howling wilderness. The present population is scanty, and so as in the case ot the
Chenab and Swat River Canals, the surplus of grain for export will be enormous and would
enable any railway to Quetta to pay handsomely. The Chenab Canal line, I believe, pays over
14 per cent.
Mr. Johns’s report on his reconnaissances for a railway to Seistan shows that a direct line
From Nushki to the Helmand at Landi Wali Muhammad and thence to Band-i-Seistan, a
distance of 335 miles, would cost Rs. 2 , 63 , 00 , 000 .
It may not be necessary to make the whole line at once. The Helmand had a minimum
depth of 2A feet when McMahon went down it River gun-boats are being made with a
draught of 2 feet and a speed of 15 knots, and with improvements tne He mand ought to be
navigable by suitable boats to the weir and thence into the Gaud-i-Zirreh lake. The length of
the railway to Landi Wali Muhammed seems to be 156 miles, which at Rs. 78,500 a mile would
jest Rs. 1 , 22 , 46 , 000 . For a desert line this estimate seems high.