‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [‎132r] (262/949)

]0. Mr. Ward has shown how, hy a band in the Helmand of the nature
of Afghan bands elsewhere, the present Tarakun canal can he made into a very
important one. Although it could never command the same area of land as
the canal system we ourselves could make, srill it could, in ordinary years and
at the time when water is most urgently needed in Persian Seistan, draw off a
large portion of the Helmand Biver.
11. It will, moreover, not take the Afghans long to learn the importance
of the desert tract, once thickly populated, on the right hank of the river.
They are beginning to realise it already, and although the construction of a
good canal system into that tract is to the Afghans of somewhat greater
difficulty, yet by temporary bands of the local type they will be able to draw
off a large portion of the Helmand Biver on that bank also.
12. In this manner the volume of water which will pass below Band-i-
Kamal Khan and escape the present Afghan band above the Band-i-Seistan will,
in ordinary years at sowing time, leave little or no water to go down the
Bud-i-Seistan and Bud-i-Parian on which the life of Persian Seistan depends.
Thus, by means which are quite within Afghan powers, Persian Seistan can
he practically ruined. The ill-feeling engendered against the Persians by
recent boundary and water disputes will prompt the Afghans, apart from all
idea of personal advantage, to make full use of the opportunity thus afforded
of injuring the Persians.
13. The danger of the situation is a very real one, and I am afraid that,
unless prompt measures are taken, it will be brought to prominent notice
within the next year or two. The only remedy appears to be to endeavour to take
steps to make the control of the Helmand Biver a measure mutually profitable
to both Afghanistan and Persia, and prevent its being made use of to the
advantage, very modified only, of Afghanistan, hut to the very serious detriment
of Persia. The danger which threatens Persian Seistan is a very serious one, and
may easily extend to the absolute ruin of that country. The only danger it
involves on the Afghans is that of active hostilities with Persia, whom the
threatened min of Seistan and presence of outside influence might posibly drive
to action. How far this contingency would deter the Afghans is doubtful, hut
the fear that Persia might receive assistance from Bussia might render them
amenable to reason.
14. The only remedy, therefore, is to explain to Persia the risk she now
runs, and to Afghanistan the material advantages she now loses from the
want of a proper and effective control of the Helmand Biver, and obtain her
consent to our taking the necessary steps.
15. Assuming that we enter upon this work on purely business lines and
put aside political objects and aims, it would be necessary, in order to repay
ourselves for the initial cost and up-keep of required works and establishment,
to obtain from Persia and Afghanistan a share of the increased revenue which
irrigation extension would produce.
In the case of Afghanistan it is essential to avoid any interference in their
revenue or executive management. By increasing their water-supply,
Afghanistan could bring under irrigation on the right bank of the river alone
an area more than double that of present commanded Afghan Seistan. In
return for this advantage Afghanistan might concede, or lease, to us all the
deserted and desolate Tarakun tract on the left of the river.
The Persians contemplate leasing to others the land revenues of Seistan.
These might be leased to us, for without our assistance in this matter there will
soon he no land ravenue at all in Persian Seistan. I he lease might safely be
taken on very generous terms, for the figures given in my letter £io. 909, dated
13th June 1903, show how great an increase of cultivation a proper canal
svstem will cause. Bailing a lease of all Seistan land revenues, a grant o a
the deserted Bamrud and other waste lands at the tail of the Tarakun canal
system might he made to us.
16. As before stated, the Helmand water suffices at a safe estimate
fully to irrigate yearly 750,000 acres of spring crop in Seistan. The present area
of spring crop cultivation in Afghan Seistan is only about 25,000 acres, an in
Persian Seistan about 50,000 acres, i.e., a total of about 75,000 acres in all.