‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [‎135r] (268/949)

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have come to Seistan at periods of scarcity at home, and settled here. They
are most friendly disposed towards us, and are very anxious to get into our
service. There are no real Afghans in the Chakansur district, and I firmly
believe that the whole population of the district would rejoice if we took
over the entire district. The whole population does not exceed some 12,000
persons, all of a quiet peaceful disposition, and I calculate there are not
more than 40 rifles in the whole country.
14. In my previous report it was shown that by controlling the Helmand
somewhere between Band-i-Kamal Khan and Chahar Burjak, the minimum
volume of water available in the autumn would allow of 750,000 acres of land
being brought yearly under spring crop. It was proposed to divide this water
into three equal shares, 1 to Afghan territory on the right bank, 1 to that on
the left bank, and 1 to Persian Seistan. Each of the above tracts could thus
bring 250,000 acres yearly under spring crop, there being more than ample
culturable land available in each tract.
It was suggested that in return for the cost of controlling the river, we
should acquire by lease or otherwise the Afghan tract of country on the left
bank. It now remains to consider what terms we should offer to His Highness
the Amir for this concession. The question is rendered an extremely difficult
one owing to the reluctance, amounting almost to religious scruple, with which
Afghans part with land, and the difficulty with which they can be made to
consider a business proposal in a reasonable or logical manner. This parti
cularly applies to questions of irrigation, in which they pride themselves on
being especially skilled. Another very serious difficulty in negotiations
regarding territory with the Afghan ruler is the astonishing ignorance which
prevails at Kabul about the outlying and distant portions of Afghanistan.
15. We are in the present case in a position to promise the Amir one-
third of the Helmand water for use on the right bank of the river. He may
argue that his proper share, as sole owner of the upper river, is more than one-
third, and that his people in Seistan can, and do already, use more than one-
third of the river. The latter part of this contention would be inaccurate.
They never have used anything like a third of the river, and at the most
important time of the agricultural year, i.e., the late autumn months, when
* The reason of this is chiefly due to the fact that early sowings should be made, they are
the construction of the bands which are necessary seldom* in a position to USC any of the
for giving them the water at this time of year leads . , n mi Y i
to so great friction with the Persians. water at all. The result is that nearly
a. h. McMahon. a n Afghan crops are late sown crops
and as such compare very unfavourably with the early sown crops of Persi-dn
Seistan. At the present moment, when the Persians are flooding their land for
early sowing, the Afghans are allowing their water to pass unused down the
river. The Rud-i-Seistan, since the Band-i-Seistan was repaired, is drawing
away one-half of the total volume, the Rud-i-Pariun one-third, and the Nadali
channel only one-sixth.
16. The value of the one-third that we would give the Afghans lies in
the fact that they would get it delivered to them at the most important time
of the year and at the highest point of their Seistan lands. This, if properly
used, will suffice to irrigate an area of early sown spring crop ten times that
of their whole present cultivated area.f
This alone represents a revenue at least
t They now cultivate 25,000 acres and could, by
the proposed control of the river, cultivate 250,000
acres of spring crop annually.
A. H. McMahon.
ten times the amount of present revenue.
17. In addition to this the control of the river would render it possible
to protect the Afghan crops from the destruction which so often overtakes them
in times of flood. This alone is a very important consideration, as much
revenue is lost under present conditions.
18. To use profitably their share of water the Afghans would have to
construct a main canal from the canal head we would cons ruct to some dis
tributing point. This would be so newhere near Kila-i-Fath. It wamld be
better if we made this fur them, but it is a question whether an offer to do so
might not cause suspicion that we wanted, under guise of irrigation, further to