‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [‎136r] (270/949)

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T-his or any other rent fixed upon should be made to cover the concession of
the free u*e of routes via Khwaja Ali to ftubdar, if it is considered necessary
to demand this. J
24. So repugnant is the idea of parting with any portion, however value
less, of his territory to an Afghan ruler, that the question, apart from all
logical and forcible arguments of other kinds that may be brought to bear on
the case, resolves itself into a question of money payment on a very generous
scale. The amount of money required to overcome the initial reluctance to
surrender land will be found to bear no relative proportion to the value or
extent of the land itself. In other words, in order to overcome the Amir's
disinclination to alienate any Afghan land whatever, it will cost almost as
much to lease a small tract as it will to lease a comparatively larger one. In
this case it is essentially a question of le premier pas qui coate. It is quite
possible that nothing under, say, five lakhs One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees per annum will suffice to overcome
the Amir's reluctance to alienate ihe tract of country on the left bank up to
Rudbar. It is equally possible, if negotiations commenced with the larger
demand, that about the same sum, or only a little more, would effect the lease
of the larger and richer tract of the whole Chakansur district, including the
smaller tract above stated which forms part of it.
25. It is a question, therefore, worth careful consideration whether we
should not take advantage of this state of affairs and commence negotiations
by a bold bid for the whole Chakansur district. In this case many of the
arguments sketched in paragraphs 15 to 20 above would not be applicable,
and we would have to restrict ourselves to the simple statement that Russian
intrigues render it necessary for us, in the joint interests of Afghanistan and
ourselves, to get nearer Persian Seistan; that we feel confident that large
irrigation works would improve Afghan Seistan, and see our way thereby to
help both the Amir and ourselves. Will he lease the district to us for ten
times its present revenue, say, 6^ lakhs One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees of rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. per annum ?
At the worst, should the Amir decline to agree to this, no harm is done,
for, while objecting to so great a sacrifice, he may the more willingly agree to
the smaller one of the tract on the left bank of the river. At the same
time the opportunity afforded for contrasting the relative values of the whole
and its parts might bring the cost of the smaller part within more reasonable
figures.
26. The advantages of acquiring the whole Chakansur district are too
obvious to need retailing here. The difficulties of administering the district
would be very small. The profits of doing so can in time be made equal to
those estimated to accrue from the Tarakun tract, i.e.> a gross income of 20
lakhs One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees , while there is the great advantage of the income not all being prospect
ive. Very little temporary improvements of existing irrigation in the Chakansur
district would largely multiply the present revenue.
27. In the matter of the pecuniary offers we should make to the Amir, I
speak with great diffidence. Political considerations so outweigh ordinary
financial ones in the present case, that one cannot argue the matter out on lines
of expenditure and income alone. However large the rent to be offered may
appear to be in the first instance, there can be no reasonable doubt that it will
lead eventually to large net profits and prove a sound financial investment.
28. I have omitted from the above calculations the country above
Rudbar to Khwaja Ali. The revenue of Khwaja Ali is about Rs. 7,000 per
annum, and does not admit of any great increase by improved irrigation.
29. It is premature at this stage of the proceedings to discuss the effect
that would be produced on the present Persian Seistan system of irrigation by
diverting two-thirds of the Helmand water above Seistan. The one-third left
available would, as explained in the previous report, suffice to cultivate many
times the present cultivated area. Many minor difficulties connected with the
question would disappear if we were in occupation of Afghan Seistan, and
portions of Persian Seistan, notably Miankangi, would largely benefit by the
manner in which we could turn surplus water from the Afghan side into that
tract. This assistance, needless to remark, the Afghans themselves would
never afford.