‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [‎145r] (288/949)

11
^ 4-5
• The figures of the past 35 years, of which
■we have more detailed information, work out as
follows:—
Extraordinary flood ...
Years
... 2
Gn at flood ... ...
... 5
Hish „
... 5
Comparatively low river ...
... 7
W T hen river dried in summer
2
Kormal flood
... 18
35
A. H. McMahcw.
+ Exact year not quite certain. It was between
1838 and 1814 .
A. H. McMahon.
65 . Our enquiries beyond 1872 , secondly, establish the fact that, in the
past 75 years,* i.e., 1830 to 1904 , there
have been two years of abnormal floods
(1830 and 1885 ), several years of great
floods, very many years of normal flood,
and only three years of abnormally low
river, when no water at all for a short
period in the summer reached the Band-i-
Kohak, viz. f i 1838 , 1871 , and 1902 . The
last one was the worst of the three.
Curiously enough in no one of these three
years was the subsequent sowing season
of spring crops injuriously affected or did
the spring crops, on which the welfare of Seistan depends, suffer.
66. In only three years out of the past thirty-five was water deficient]: at
I Tbi. w» s the natural consequence of alongand time for Spring crop Sowing, tiz.,
widespread cycle of dry years, 1863 to 1877 . 18 / 7 , 1878 , and 1880 . This IS a fact which
a. u. McMahon. must be carefully kept in mind in dealing
with the Seistan water question.
67 - Seistan suffers, therefore, more from excess of water than deficiency
thereof. For each one of the above three years of deficiency, there have been
very many in which crops have suffered largely from floods, not only owing to
direct inundation from the rivers, but from the Hamun itself rising and over
flowing the protection embankments, on which alone a large area of Persian
Seistan depends for safety from inundation. In the two years of abnormal
flood in lh 30 and 1885 , not only all crops, but also all the buried stores of grain
from previous harvests were destroyed.
68. In the foregoing remarks it has been necessary to enter somewhat
, , , . into details. In case these may have
Summary of general oonclusious. , « ,, . , /
obscured any of the more important salient
points, it is advisable, even at the risk of a little repetition, to summarise the
principal facts and data.
69 . The data and axioms available for the solution of this problem may
be briefly defined as follows :—
( 1 ) No definite disputes can be specifically stated as now requiring
individual settlement. The water question is one of broad princi
ples.
( 2 ) The Persian Government vaguely claim that the Afghans have no
right to erect bands above the Band-i-Seistan, as these must
diminish the present volume of water at that place.
( 3 ) The Afghan Government do not admit that there is any water ques
tion in dispute, as their geographical position makes them sole
owners of the wh< le Helmand above the Band-i-Seistan.
(4) The present arbitration is restricted by the condition that the award
must be in accordance wuth the terms of the Goldsmid award.
(5) That award, and the interpretation thereof, as ruled by the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs in 1873 , which now forms an integral
portion of it, are stated in paragraphs 8 to 13 above.
(6) The only thing that appears absolutely necessary to be now done
is to define the term “ water requisite for irrigation on both
banks of the Helmand
( 7 ) It is reasonable to assume that by irrigation is meant not only
present irrigation, but possible future extension of irrigation
and cultivation on both banks.
(8) To estimate the requisite supply of water, we must first calculate
the culturable areas for which it is required on each bank. It
is impossible to get an accurate estimate if we restrict our
calculations to only lands on both banks below Band-i-Seistan,
the point where the Helmand now happens to reach Persian