‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [‎156r] (310/949)

[ 7 1
* Page 42 of report on a survey for a route for a
telegraph line from Las Bela to Kuhak.
less than two years for Rs. 65,000 a mile. There are no natural difficulties of any consequence.
The lines from Kundi on the trade route (Miran Kandi in map) to Pasni and Karachi are much
more difficult, and would cost Kb. 1,18,000 a mile and would take 6 to 8 years to build. No
surveys by a railway engineer are available further to the west than Tump, up to which
Mr. Johns found a good line along the Kej valley. Telegraph officers have, I think, been
over the line from Tump to Bampur shown in the map, and Mr. Newcome Wilson, of the
Indo-Telegraph Department, reports * that the
line from Panjgur (Isai Kalat Isa on the map)
to Kul>ak is easy except for the Mashkhel and
Rakshan crossings. Thence to Bampur is also reported to be fairly open country.
The route from Nushki to Kharau [was surveyed by Captain Mackenzie and is reported t
+ Report on a reconnaissance from Karachi to to he fairly easy excej t at the east near Nushki.
Kharan and thence to Nushki. From Kharan on we have no details, hut the
country is probably fairly open hut water is scarce. It is certain that none of these lines from
east to west are so easy or can he so quickly constructed as Mr. Johns’ lines from Nushki by
the trade route to Koh-i-Malik Slab or via the Helmund to Seistan (Kohak).
Lieutenant Hopkins gives f a good account of a possible metre-gauge line from Bunder
+ a j.- i? r* v inns qv Dilam to Shiraz which would he thinks pay 5
t Secret F., December 190 3 , No. 37 . i. u i {
* per cent. He also apparently believes that a
line could be made from Shiraz to Kerman without serious difficulties. The line to Shiraz is
much the same as that suggested by General Goldsmid, Curzon’s Persia, Volume I,
page 636, and therefore deserves attention, especially if it is capable of being carried further
to the east.
From this report of Colonel Rittich and references in the Ncvoe Vremya of late it appears
that the Russians are afraid that we may undertake some such line across Persia, though it
pleases them to affect that such a line would only assist them in an advance on India. They
are, however, avowedly nervous at the prospect of a German line being built to Baghdad, which
is a point worth consideration. At any rate it is clearly to our interest to prevent the con
struction by Russia of any line leading to the south from Tehran ; and, if we are prepared to
make such lines ourselves we have a great claim to be heard, as we have an autograph pledge
No. 14 of precis of Persian pledges. gi\en by the late Shah on 16th September 1888
jt gg and recognised as binding by the present Shah.
The Russian Minister in Persia is aware of the
existence of this pledge. This pledge is to this effect that “ the priority of the English Govern
ment and the company of that Government over others in the construction of a Southern
Railway to Tehran continues to hold good, and certainly, whenever railway concessions in the
north are given to others, immediately a concession tor a railway from Tehran to Shuster or
such a one, will be given to the English Company .... and positively no Southern
railway without consultation with the English Government will be granted to any foreign
company.”
If pledges are to be disregarded, we still perhaps can effectually contest a Russian advance
to the sea or in the direction of India from Persia.
One thing is clear that any railway built to facilitate an advance on India from the
west must pass through or close to Seistan, and that is the only place where a self-supporting
advanced base, protected on every side, except along the Helmund, by deserts, could be formed.
It is equally obvious that with the railway to Nushki opened by June 1905, we are in a
position to make a line to Seistan long before the Russians. Our position qua Seistan is
therefore much more favourable than theirs and, as long as we hold Seistan, they can neither
attack India from the west up the Helmund or work down to the Gulf along the Baluchistan
border. They did indeed try to secure a promise from the late Shah that, if we made a line
to the Persian 1 rentier, they should be allowed to make one to the south of Persia, but the Shah
No. 39 of pr&is of Persian Pledges. t " ld * be , “ ini ? tel ; a * T ? hra J n " n U 1 th
September 1890 that he had refused to make
any such promise, relying upon the written assurance given to him. This assurance was
apparently that given by Earl Granville to Malcolm Khan on 16th August 1884 and was to the
effect that the integrity of Persia would he respected by England and Russia so long as
No. 7 of precis of Persian Pledges. ^ c ? n, P la )“ t i A " aUem P t
° will be made later to show that we can even
block an advance to the head of the Gulf with seme fair prospect of success.
The question for immediate decision is if any steps should be taken to meet the present
action of Russia in constructing railway formations in the guise of roads in Northern Persia,
and, if so, what those steps should be.
Nothing seems to be necessary in iSeistan, as we know that we can push our line through
to that long before a Russian line can be constructed from Askabad or Tejend, as
Secret F., October 1902 , N«>. 8 . Captain Smythe’s and Lieutenant Haslam’s
Secret F., May 1903 , Nos. 2 - 4 . reports show that such a railway has to cross
some very difficult country. Besides, the construction of our railway to Seistan would be a
direct challenge to Russia, which at present it may be undesirable to make.
On the west however our position is less secure and depends largely on the piecrust
pledges of a Persian Government, which may not last or be able to fulfil its promises, even if
it wished to do so. To meet this difficulty, I venture with great diffidence to make a