‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [‎159v] (317/949)

14
Tehran, Kum, Kashan, Isfahan (by a branch line Kashan-Isfahan), and Tezd. The whole
of the Central Persian plateau would thus fall under Russian control, and fiom this line s le
could push her influence southwards—to such places as Sultanabad, Shiraz, and elsewhere as
she pleased.
(it) Such a line would not merely firmly establish Russian influence throughout the
whole of Central Persia, but it would also effectually destroy British influence in the south,
for it would skirt, along its northern flank, the whole of the sphere that we have hitherto
been disposed to claim.
(tit) The line would be a relatively cheap and easy one to construct, for it would proceed
through a generally level country, with few mountain passes; and it would also be cheap and
easy to guard, for the tribes along it are of a peaceful character, and would give no trouble.
(iv) I do not quite follow Captain Rittich’s idea that it would also cut in twain the
Indo-African ambitions of Great Britain, because I am not aware that we entertain them :
nor, if we did, do I see that they would be effectually injured by this railway.
II. Strategical. —The strategical advantages of the line are even more striking.
(t) It possesses the supreme merit of enabling the Russians to direct against Southern
Persia, or against the Indian frontier on the Seistan-Mekran section, the whole of the troops
of the Caucasus, escaping both the Caspian crossing, the precarious transit along the single
lii^e of the Trans-Caspian Railway, and the long march southwards from the direction of
Meshed.
(ii) It possesses the scarcely inferior merit from the Russian standpoint of avoiding
the Gulf altogether, with a British fleet patrolling it, with British forces very likely in occupa
tion of its principal ports, and with British warships closing its mouth. It takes Russia
right out into the open ocean, and plants her on the sea at Chahbar, a place which by dint
of the great expenditure that Russia is never reluctant to undertake, could be converted into
a naval base of considerable strength in close proximity to the western borders of British
protected territory.
(in) Similarly, if a branch line were constructed from Bam to Seistan, would the
railway enable Russia to reinforce her position in Seistan, and to throw a force upon the
Afghan frontier, on the Kandahar flank, from the double direction of the Caucasus and the
combined position in Trans-Caspia and Turkistan.
(iv) The line would be absolutely invulnerable against British attack until it reached
the neighbourhood of the British frontier. It would be protected by the great desert on the
north, and by mountains on the south. It would be too far from the sea to be cut from
that quarter: and it would have achieved its purpose before we could even scratch its
extremities.
Finally, the line possesses the physical advantage of running parallel, through its entire
length, to the general trend of the Persian mountain system, instead of attempting to cut it:
and the commercial advantage of tapping all the principal Persian entrepflts of trade.
9 . Now if this statesmanlike and far-seeing scheme be seriously taken in hand, what
have we to set against it? We have the promise of the late Shah that any Russian railway
concession in the north will be balanced by a corresponding British one in the south, and that
• He did not gay Government. n( > southern railway concession shall be granted
C[ttbzon]. to any foreign company* without consultationf
f A very different thing from consent. with the British Government. We have our
C[ubzon]. position in the Gulf, which is one of no mean
strength, and which enables us at any moment to put pressure both upon the Persians and
the Russians, in the manner indicated in my recent Despatch to the Home Government. And
we have our position and opportunities in Seistan, which we can always develop at a quicker
rate than the Russians, and which should place it in our power to exert great pressure in
that quarters.
10. All of these advantages however, if they are to be turned to account, postulate a
strong initiative, and a resolute determination on the part of the Home Government, which
it would be sanguine to anticipate in all circumstances. It is, indeed, more probable that the
demand for the Russian railway would be put forward in such a form and at such a time as
might render the British Government reluctant to authorise any very strong measures, and
might elicit from them nothing more than the suggestion that we should take some counter
steps in the road or railway line to protect our own position.
11 . This is just the point at which it is the duty of our Intelligence Department and
military authorities to step in and advise. The Russians are beginning to move, so to speak,
by two parallels. First come the chaussees in the north, which are to carry railroads later on.
Then, when these have been finished, rails will be laid upon them, and the full-blown project
that I have been discussing in this note wall emerge. What steps shall we take to anticipate
or guard against it now? What steps should we take to check or to respond to it then?
12. There seem to me to be three aspects of this case—
(i) Is it possible or desirable for us to demand the grant of any corresponding roads or
concessions in the south, and would they, if granted, be of the smallest strategical advantage
to us in the future ?