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‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [169r] (336/949)
The record is made up of 1 file (475 folios). It was created in 7 Nov 1901-23 Aug 1905. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .
Transcription
This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.
7
m
would be drawn down into country well removed from the main theatre
of operations and from whence they could only move small forces towards
Nushki to turn our flank at Quetta. But this line would cross the water
sheds, take a long time to construct, and be very costly. Either of the
others would be shorter, cheaper, and more easily constructed. They would
also have the advantage of providing more rapid means for transferring
our forces from the neighbourhood of Quetta and Kandahar to Scistan. and
vice versa, whilst being sufficiently protected on the north by the Dasht-i-
Margo and Registan desert from attacks from Russian troops operating
on the Herat-Kandahar line. But they both have the great disadvantage
that in the event of our being forced to give up Seistan, they would give
the enemy great assistance in prosecuting a turning movement against our
main positions which would be extremely dangerous to us.
In dealing with this part of the question the greatest care must be taken
that we do nothing by which we may play into the hands of the Russians
at later stages of the game. Captain Rittich’s scheme, if seriously under
taken, will take several years to carry out; and if we construct a railway
from the sea to Seistan as soon as there are indications that the Russian
scheme is being commenced, we should be adopting the best means to minim
ise its danger—and such action might even cause the Russians to abandon
such a costly programme. A railway line from the sea to Seistan would
also have great value in enabling us to hold Seistan against Russia. Such
a line, therefore, has a double value, and is one which probably we shall
have to construct in due course to secure the safety of our left flank. But
railway communication between India and Seistan stands on a different
plane. At present one of the greatest assets we have to the defence of India
is that between us and the Russian frontiers there still remains a wide tract
of country without railways, and we should be extremely careful before we
bridge the barren country between Nushki and Seistan by means of a rail
way which would be of assistance to the Russians if we were forced to retire
from Seistan.
As previously mentioned, the utmost danger on the side of Persia is
to be expected in the form of a Russian move from her Trans-Caspian rail
way to Seistan. This we should try to prevent, or postpone, as long as pos
sible. But if Russia moves in that direction, we shall have to make up our
minds permanently to occupy Seistan unless we intend to let it fall to Russia.
If she secures it, she will not only be able to turn our left flank completely,
but she will also have obtained a position which will render it extremely
difficult for us to maintain any line to oppose her subsequent advance through
Teheran and Kerman, as advocated by Captain Rittich. Whilst, therefore,
the possession of the line from Bunder Abbas is of great importance to us,
the effective retention of this line depends on our possession of Seistan. And
if we intend to secure Seistan, we must be prepared to hold it with a force
of sufficient strength to maintain its position there, as any retreat of British
troops would have a very serious effect on the military position in India.
The existing army in India cannot spare the necessary force or afford to
have any portion of its strength locked up there, and the troops for that
purpose would have to be additional to the present army in this country.
Summarising the above considerations, it is thought that, whether
as a counter to this latest Russian project -if it is seriously commenced - or
as a reply to a move on their part from the direction of Meshed towards
Seistan, we should construct a railway from the sea to Seistan and securely
protect its terminus at Seistan by establishing an adequate force there. We
should not throw down the challenge without due cause, or precipitate
matters, as it will mean great expenditure and an increase to our forces in
this country. But if she tries to anticipate us in this direction we shall
have to act promptly to secure the defence of India.
If it be decided that the measures here indicated are those which would
be best from the military point of view as a counter to Russian rail y
extensions towards Baluchistan and the sea, it seems desirable that e . 7
steps should be taken to have a thorough examination of the country made >y
About this item
- Content
This part contains papers mostly relating to British interests in Persia [Iran] and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .
It includes a copy of the Board of Trade Commercial Intelligence Committee ‘Report received from Mr. H. W. Maclean, the Special Commissioner appointed by the Commercial Intelligence Committee of the Board of Trade, on the conditions and prospects of British trade in Persia.’
A handwritten note at the front of the file, on folio 5, states ‘Spare copy of notes & correspondence of the “Helmand Control” file (with maps)’. Folio 110 consists of handwritten notes, including one dated 27 April 1904, which states ‘The secret Helmand papers have been printed up, and a set, with necessary maps, is submitted for H.E. the Viceroy to take to England.’ Much of the file concerns the question of controlling the water of the Helmand river and irrigating its whole delta, and the work of the Seistan Arbitration Commission to arbitrate between Persia and Afghanistan on the question of rights to the water of the Helmand in Seistan.
The file also includes reports by W A Johns on reconnaissances of potential railway routes made while he was attached to the Seistan Arbitration Commission, and other papers relating to railways and roads in Persia.
In addition, the file includes copies of the following Government of India Foreign Department Proceedings, which reproduce received Foreign Department correspondence on the following subjects: ‘Selection of a British naval base in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .’, November 1901, Nos. 74-83; ‘Visit of His Excellency the Viceroy to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. during November-December 1903.’, February 1904, Nos. 33-127; ‘Establishment of telegraphic communication with Henjam. Question of the selection of a naval base in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . Aggressive action of the Persians at Tamb and Abu Musa; their claim to the Islands.’, June 1904, Nos. 300-388; ‘Reports of the Commercial Mission to Persia.’, June 1905, Nos. 45-111; ‘Question of retaining flagstaffs erected in the neighbourhood of the Musandim Promontory’, August 1905, Nos. 288-307.’
The file also includes: brief handwritten notes written by Curzon on headed paper belonging to the Viceregal Lodge, Simla, relating to Seistan and to Lord Kitchener’s planned reforms for the reorganisation and redistribution of the Indian Army; and a printed copy of the report ‘A Note by Major H.L. [Herbert Lionel] Showers, C.I.E., on the present state of affairs in Kelat and a review of the system of Administration now being pursued.’
The file includes four maps: ‘Map of the Tail waters of Helmand River’ (13 July 1903), f 122; ‘Plan Shewing Proposed Routes for a Railway from Nushki to Afghan Frontier near Robat’ (10 April 1903), f 139; ‘Extract from Admiralty Chart No. 753. (Entrance to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ).’ (October 1901), f 219; and ‘Sketch of route Ram Hormuz to Fellahieh.’ (April 1904), f 230.
- Extent and format
- 1 file (475 folios)
- Arrangement
The papers are arranged in no apparent order, apart from the Government of India Foreign Department Proceedings, folios 231 to 474, which are arranged in chronological order.
- Written in
- English in Latin script View the complete information for this record
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- Reference
- Mss Eur F111/359/1
- Title
- ‘Persia – especially Seistan’
- Pages
- front, 2r:194v, 195v:196r, 197v:199v, 200v, 201v, 203r:272r, 273v:275v, 277r:405v, 408r:408v, 409v, 411r:413v, 414v:419v, 420v:424v, 425v:432v, 433v:435v, 436v, 437v:443v, 444v:471v, 473r:475v
- Author
- East India Company, the Board of Control, the India Office, or other British Government Department
- Usage terms
- Open Government Licence