‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [‎172r] (342/949)

or 10 crores. I look upon it that this expenditure would never be agreed to for this abso
lutely unremunerative line at all events under present conditions.
My view then in regard to Rittich’s project is—
(1) To obtain concession for road and railway from Bunder Abbas to Regan as soon as
Russia moves.
t
(2) Should Russia commence a line from Tehran towards Yezd,to reply by commenc
ing the line Bunder Abbas-Regan (about 250 miles) by a road on railway gradi
ents.
(3) But in the meantimeendeavour by every means to make the line Chaman-Kandahar-
Khwaja Ali or Nushki-Khwaja Ali.
(4<) If Russia advance their line from Meshed to Seistan, reply by (3).
(5) For the present maintain a small force at Robat with support north of Chagai. We
have now the upper hand and should keep it.
In regard to ( 2 ), I would follow Russia’s lead and show that we were prepared to push a
line to Regan to prevent her doing so. It may be considered that India would be so threatened
by an advance of Russia to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. as to warrant expenditure from Indian revenues.
The distance is about 250 miles and the cost would be probably 3 crores.
But I would support Seistan from Kandahar and make the line of communication through
that place.
The main point to keep in view is that with Afghanistan obstructive our strategical scheme
practically falls to the ground.
The question how far Russia’s action in Persia should he considered a “ casus belli ” is one
of Imperial policy, but in my opinion any infringement of our sphere of influence in southern
Persia or aggressive action towards Seistan should be considered so. If war is inevitable, it is
better to have it before Russian schemes for advance are completed than when they have been
carried out. I agree with the Commander-in-Chief that the occupation of Seistan would
necessitate an increase to our Army chiefly by utilising Baluchis.
I cannot help thinking that we are safe from Captain Rittich’s scheme for some time to
come for with the effects of the present war to face, Russia is hardly likely to find 20 million
sterling for the central Persian line for strategical purposes in the near future.
24,.4,-04. E. R. E[lles].
His Excellency the Viceroy.
As your Excellency did not wish to mention the case in Council on 25th I took back
the file from Private Secretary to Viceroy and now resubmit it with a note by the Military
Member that I have just received.
The final decision about an outpost at Robat and a supporting post somewhere north of
Chagai was that the matter should be carefully considered, as, if and when Colonel McMahon
withdrew from Seistan, it might be advisable to adopt this action. The route from Nushki
to Barabchah, which appears to be the most suitable place for a supporting post as it is situated
at an altitude of about 5,600 feet and possess a good supply of water and fodder, will I hope
shortly be further investigated. It also commands the best and shortest approaches to the
Helmand.
If your Excellency so desires copies of the notes will be printed up and a selection of
the papers sent home for your use.
27-4-04. L- W. Dane.
I have now read all the notes, but do not consider it necessary to write further at the
present stage. Please have the file printed up and send me half a dozen copies by next mail to
London.
28-4-04.
C[okzon].