‘Confidential. Persia’ [‎484v] (18/112)

crushed out of national existence, and falling
practically under the complete domination of an
other power. It would be necessary in that case,
before the intervening State had virtually disap
peared, to consider what alternative course our in
terests might demand now that the object to which
our efforts had hitherto been directed was no longer
attainable.
" Applying these principles to Persia, we have
long recognized the superior interests of Russia in
the northern portion of the Shah’s dominions,
which must naturally result from the long extent
of her conterminous frontier. Whatever steps we
may have taken to maintain our position in
Northern Persia have therefore been taken as much
in the interests of Persia herself and of her na
tional independence as in our own, which are not
directly threatened by Persian superiority in these
regions, except in so far as it might affect the
Persian capital and seat of Government.
" In the south, on the other hand, for fully a
century our efforts have been successfully devoted to
building up a substantial and pre-eminent mer
cantile position, with the result that we have ac
quired an altogether exceptional interest in that
part of Persia.
ff In all these matters, His Majesty’s Govern
ment have consistently sought to maintain the
continued national existence and the territorial in
tegrity of Persia, and to develop her resources.
Their policy in this respect is in strict accoi danco
with the understanding arrived at between Great
Britain and Russia in 1834, which was reaffirmed
by an exchange of assurances in 1888, pledging
the two Governments to respect and promote the
integrity and independence of Persia. So long as
the Persian Government will work with us cor
dially upon the lines indicated in this despatch,
they will find His Majesty’s Government ready
to support them in the promotion and protection
of what are, in fact, common objects, to the ad
vantage of both countries alike.
“If, on the other hand, in face of our warnings
the Persian Government should elect to encourage
the advance of Russian political influence and in
tervention in these regious in any of the forms
which I have indicated above, His Majesty's Gov
ernment would necessarily have to reconsider their
policy; and they would regard themselves as justi
fied in taking such measures as might appear to
them best calculated to protect the interests so
endangered, even though in the adoption of such
measures it might no longer be possible to make
the integrity and independence of Persia their
first object as hitherto."
A copy of this despatch was given by
Sir A. Hardinge unofficially to the Ata-
beg-i-Azam, who similarly communicated
a memorandum composed by the Shah
himself in reply. This document, with
much that was irrelevant, contained His
Majesty’s declaration that his Government
will never come to an understanding with
any foreign power against Great Britain,
does not intend alienating any portion
of Persian territory to a foreign power for
a military station, will not pledge any of