‘Confidential. Persia’ [‎520r] (89/112)

*
*
*
* ’
86
* See pages 17 and 18 above.
Secret E, Jnly 1902, Nos. 241-306, Enclosure,
Preceding flo. 279.
“The Persian Government should therefore
distinctly understand and bear in mind that Great
Britain could not consent to the acquisition by
Russia of a military or naval station in the Persian
Gulf, for the reason that such a station must
he regarded as a challenge to Great Britain and a
menace to her Indian Empire.
“If the Persian Government were at any time
to make such a concession to Russia, it would be
necessary for His Majesty’s Government to take
in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. such measures as they might
consider necessary for the protection of British
interest : measures which, in view of their naval
strength in those waters, would be attended with
no serious difficulty.
“Nor, again, could His Majesty’s Government
acquiesce in the concession to Russia of any pre
ferential political rights or advantages, or any
commercial monopoly or exclusive privilege in
the southern or south-eastern districts of Persia,
including Seistan. British interests must inevit
ably suffer by such concessions, and the Persian
Government have themselves recognized and
acquiesced in this view on more than one occasion.
They gave in October 1897 a written promise to
Her Majesty’s Minister at Tehran that the customs
of Southern Persia should never be placed under
foreign control and supervision. A\ hen in 19()0
the customs revenues were pledged as security for
the loan obtained from the Russian Banque des
Frets, a special exception was made of the revenues
and ports of Southern Persia, and when Her
Majesty’s Charge d’Affaires in April 1900 called
the attention of the Persian Minister for Foreign
Affairs to the interest which the British Govern
ment had in the ports of Mohammerah, Bn shire,
Bundar Abbas, and other ports of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ,
and insisted on the right of Her Majesty’s Govern
ment to be consulted before any change was made
in the administration of the customs at Mobam-
merah or in the position of the Sheikh, His
Excellency replied that ‘ not only in Mohamraerah,
hut in every part of Persia where British interests
were concerned, the Persian Government, before
taking any steps of importance, would consult
the British Government.’ His Majesty’s Govern
ment have taken note of this assurance with
satisfaction, and have only to add that a hypothe
cation of the integral revenues of any of the south
ern or south-eastern provinces of Persia as security
for a foreign loan would he even more detrimental
to Persian interests, and not less objectionable from
a British point of view than that of the customs
of the southern ports.”
The Shah’s autograph reply,* winch was
subsequently embodied as an official docu
ment, contained a general assurance that
his Government would never come to an
understanding with any foreign power
against Great Britain, did not intend
alienating any portion of Persian territory
to a foreign power lor a military station,
and would not pledge any of its internal
revenues.
7. On 17th January 1902, in the House
of Commons, Viscount Cranborne, Under
secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
said:—
*****