'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎16r] (31/1386)

I lu$ Documrnt is the propertij of His Ih'itannlc Majesty's (Government.
SECRET.
Precis of (-()i res|>ondence regiirdin^ the Mesopotiimian
Expedition—Its Genesis and Development.
Prepared in the Military Department of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. .
a.)
I his particular phase oi die Great War though naturally and rightly
regarded as a subsidiary issue, may have results either for good or evil, o*f
the most far reaching consequence, it is therefore desirable to place’on
record the origin of the expedition, the causes which justified it, and the
successhe steps which have marked its progress, more especially as our
recent reverses have been the signal for much ill-informed criticism of the
Government, both by individuals and the Press.
1 hiring the earlier phases of the campaign each succeeding victory Avas
greeted with applause, and was prematurely welcomed, not only in the Press
but also m many influential quarters, as stages on the road to Baghdad.
W ith equal omniscient emphasis both Press and the critics now condemn a
policy which they have hitherto applauded, sometimes in extravagant terms
as “the one campaign which had been brilliantly successful throughout.”
for these reasons it is here attempted to give as briefly as possible in
documentary form a connected account of the political * history of the
Mesopotamian campaign without dwelling unduly on its military episodes.
1 he India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. is more especially concerned with the responsibility of
the Secretary of State for India, and consequently special prominence is
given to that aspect of the case.
Although no actual rupture with Turkey took place until the
* No. 13 (1914), bill November, it will be seen from the
tlmf ti p * i ii • c ^ fbipei issued in that month
that the forte had shown signs of great hostility to England from the very
outbreak of our war with Germany. J
As early as 11th August the Baghdad Army had begun to be mobilised
martial law had been proclaimed, and the property of British subjects had
been seized. My 2 1st August the Government of India were contemplating
sending H.M.S. (him and Lawrence ” to the Shatt-el-Arab, and landing
100 sepoys Term used in English to refer to an Indian infantryman. Carries some derogatory connotations as sometimes used as a means of othering and emphasising race, colour, origins, or rank. at Abadan to protect the AngJo-Persian Oil Company’s
Settlement. 1 J
The Military Secretary. India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , drew the attention of the Secretary
of State to the facts in relation to India by two Minutes of the 24th August
and tlie _bth September, laying stress on the dangers to our Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran.
interests, consolidated with so much care and effort in the past, and on the
menace, not only to the security of the North-Western Frontier but to
oui tianquiliity and prestige in India itself, which hostilities with Turkev
involved.
;i'he Minute of the 2Gth September 1914 entitled “ The Pole of India in
a lurkish VV ar is so germane to what followed, that it appears necessarv to
quote from it at some length.
•; Ail the omens point to war with Turkey within a few weeks or even days Such a
contingency need not alarm us unless the Turks succeed in drawing the Arabs to their side
In that case they will probably proclaim a Jehad and endeavour to raise Afghanistan and the
frontier tribes against Us which might be a serious danger to India and would most certainlv
add enormously to our ditheulties and responsibilities. This shows how important it is to us
to avert a 1 urko-Arab coalition. 1
- It is known that Turkey has been intriguing right and left to win over the Arabs and it
KS even said that Bin baood, the leading Arab chief, has been induced to join the Turks f
this is true, we may eicpect serious trouble, both in Mesopotamia and in Eo-ynt.
. i ana 111 iLtyypt.
have discussed tins aspect of the case with Major Shakespear, and he feels sure that Bin
Shoo, has not .yet full, commuted himself as his hatred of the Turks is too pronounce, to
ot an easy surrender to their bland,shments. Moreover, he is convinced that we have
oidy to g.ve some sure s,p, of our intention to support him and the Arabs generallv a-ainat
tbe I urks. to tun, the balance m our favour. How can we give such a sign f Mv solution of
t ic problem ,s tliat we must give the signal before war breaks out or it may be too late and
that the best wav of doing so, is to send a force from India to the Shatt-el-Avab at mice ’
. . " " 6 0im “yy ' lo • s0 t, ! e moment without arousing any suspicion. Troops and
ships are ... readiness at Bombay. '1 be Navy can convoy them to the month of the Gulf and
M.S. 128. \