'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎16v] (32/1386)

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The Division had previously been warned for service either in Kyypr, Africa, or elsewhere.
the Expedition, if despatcdied under sealed orders, could arrive at the mouth of the fehatt-el-
\rah without a soul knowing anything about its despatch for this purpose.
••On arrival the troops can be landed on Persian soil at Muhaminerahoi at Abadan Island,
ostensibly to protect the oil installation, but in reality to notify to the Turks that we meant
business and to the Arabs that we were ready to support them. So startling and unexpected
a si*>'n of our power to strike would at once determine the attitude of the Sheikhs of
Muhammerah and Koweit as well as of Bin Saood, and the support of the Arabs would
utterly destroy all prospect of Turkish success either in Mesopotamia or in Egypt. With the
Arabs on our side a Jehad is impossible, and our Indian Frontier is safe from attack.
” The force that we might thus despatch in the first instance need not be large as it will
be perfectly secure from attack by the Turkish Division at Basra in its position on the left
bank of the Shatt-el-Arab. I am of opinion that it might be limited to one Brigade of the
6 th Division, two Mountain Batteries, two Companies Sappers.
“ jf war breaks out it will be necessary to occupy Basra at once, and this force would not
be sufficient for such a purpose if the Baghdad troops had also been brought down. This
contino-ency might be provided for by bringing the necessary reinforcements later on to
Basidu"(Kishmf, where they would be within two days sail of the Shaft-el-Arab. We should
thus have a force more than sufficient to deal within any Turkish opposition south of Baghdad
itself.
* * * * *
“ This seems the psychological moment to take action. So unexpected a stroke at this
moment would have a startling effect.
“ (1) It would checkmate Turkish intrigues and demonstrate our ability to strike.
“ (2) It would encourage the Arabs to rally to us, and confirms the Sheikhs of Muham-
merah and Koweit in their allegiance.
“ (3) It would safeguard Egypt, as without Arab support a Turkish invasion is
impossible.
“ (4) It would effectually protect the oil installation at Abadan.
Such results seem to justify fully the proposed action."
These views commended themselves to Lord Crewe, and the same evening
the following telegram was despatched under Ids orders :—
“ From Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, Army Department, 26th September lbl4.
No. 1062. The situation as regards Turkey is most menacing, and it may be necessary
to demonstrate at head of Persian (mlf.
“ For this purpose 6 th Division would suit admirably, but this should be kept absolutely
secret and no hint given of possible change of destination.*
“ Should Cabinet decide to take ibis action, one Brigade of 6 th Division with two Mountain
Batteries and Sappers should be shipped at once as if they were urgently required for Egypt,
but with sealed orders to proceed to Shatt-el-Arab.
“ Will communicate further on this subject to-morrow. Pending this take no action."
The following day the tension with Turkey relaxed somewhat, and on the
28th September 11)14 the Secretary of State for India cabled to the Viceroy,
Army Department:—
No. 1085. My No. 1062. The situation is still acute, but it is decided to take no action
for a couple of days. Meanwhile be prepared to act as proposed.
The following telegrams still further elucidate the sequence of events.
It will be seen that the situation rapidly became so critical that the (•abinet
decided on the 2nd October to take precautionary measures, and to send a
Force to the Shatt-el-Arab to guard our interests : —
“ From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 28th September 1914.
** Foreign Secret. Following from Resident at Bushire, No. 1149. dated 26th September:—
“‘Informer Mahomet Amin supplied me with copies of what he declares are translations of
three cypher telegrams sent in latter half of July by Enver Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , of Constantinople, to Bin
Saood warning latter of the despatch of arms and ammunition, and officers for training his
Arabs, measures called for by the imminence of war in Europe.
“ ‘ In further telegrams Enver informed Vali of Basra that Turkish (iovernment is prepared
to help Germany in return for assistance received during Balkan War; that arms and
ammunition are being sent to Basra under German Hag. and that 32 secret emissaries,
including German officers, are on their way to preach a Jehad m Afghanistan, Baluchistan,
and India.' ”
“ From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Army Department,
# dated 2nd October 1914.
“No. 1134. Reference my telegrams Nos. 1062 and 1085.
“Government have decided to take action therein indicated. The force mentioned should
be embarked so as to sail on 10th, together with Expedition “A," its real destination being-
only communicated by sealed orders after ships have sailed. Suggest you sending a special
Staff Officer with Officer Commanding Force, who will be able to communicate your
instructions and hand over books, maps, Ac.
“ Admiralty consider that no escort is required from Karachi onwards, nor from Bombay, if
they leave with the main body, but on this point tinal decision should rest with Naval
Commander-in-Chief, who. as officer on spot, has best information.