'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎229r] (463/1386)

49
I he weather is somewhat better though still threatening', the river has fallen, but hb.
men have suffered greatly and are not in a condition for strenuous work. Nevertheless
matters are improving and he ought to be able to hold his present front until reinforcements,
now in Mesopotamia, ai-rive.
‘ The date upon which he will again be able to contemplate advance to relief of Kut
depends mainly upon the arrival of a fresh bridging-train, which is his greatest need. Boats
and superstructure are on their way up-river, but the local boats are proving quite unsuitable
for the purpose, and a largely increased number of pontoons is essential from India at the
earliest possible date.
“ ‘ As regards supplies we believe we can, largely on account of his heavy losses, keep hb«i
supplied until he is again made up to war establishment and the three new Brigades arrive.
By that time we hope sufficient river transport will have arrived from India ami
elsewhere to meet increased demand. I am answering your wire, 36/2/84 of 27th, regardin'.;
supplies, separately.
“ ‘ As bearing upon question of Aylmer’s future advance, I trust arrival of at lea,sl a
portion of three promised Brigades can be expedited ; otherwise I shall have no reserve hi
hand to support in case of a reverse. Aylmer gives a somewhat unfavourable account of the
moral of his Indian troops, but 1 am inclined to think this is largely due to bad weather and,
t hat with finer and warmer weather their spirits will return, especially if their severe losses
in officers who understood them can be made good.’
Commander-in-Chief adds that in Delhi his estimate was that 15th January was earliest
date on which Aylmer could advance and he did not press Nixon to order an early advance.
“ No appeals from Townshend have reached Commander-in-Chief. A true estimate of
Townshend’s position as regards supplies has been called for from Lake.”
On the 2nd February tiie Chief of Imperial General Stall telegraphed
(No. 12,788, S.D. 2) to the Commander-in-Chief that the 18th Division in
Fgypt was being prepared for despatch to Mrs p>Mamia.
On the 3rd Sir B. Duff telegraphed :—
“ Telegram from Commander-in-Chief, India, to Chief of Imperi il Gmeiwl Staff.
dated 3rd February 1916.
“ 37,624. ^ onr 12,748 cipher M.O. 2. of 1st February.
“ General Aylmer has now over 18f squadrons, 23 battalions, and 46 guns with him at
Um-Al-Hannah while reinforcements 7 battalions and 4 guns are en route between Ama -aji
and Shaikh. 1 He should be quite strong enough to hold his jH-esent position in the existing
circumstances. You were informed of the supply situation of Aylmer’s Force in my 36, (xW
of 29th January, which was based on information supplied by General Lake and does my
disclose any real grounds for apprehension on this score, though, of course. I should like Aylmer
to have a larger reserve with him. With every desire to expedite the despatch of the three
brigades it would be imprudent in view of the present situation on the frontier to send more
troops away from In lia until troops to replace them have actually arrived.”
On the 7tlillie repeated a telegram (No. 37,701) from General bake that
General ToWsliend would, on short rations, have food up to April the 17l.h,
both for the garrison and the civil j opulation of 0,000 inhabitants. He also
reported that scurvy had appeared among the Indian troops.
On the 8th the Chief of the Imperial General Staff telegraphed (No. 13,007)
enquiring what orders had been given to General Lake. The reply is o-iven
below J
“ From Commander-in-Chief, India,Do Chief of Imperial General Staff, dated
11th February 1916.
38,439. The following telegram has been
Force “ 1) ” :—
received from General Officer Commanding,
“1008/416/0. 10th February. 38,065 9th Feb. Very Secret. Aylmer’s general plan i*
to advance with the maximum force for which land transport is available by night 1 march .to'
the right bank. The actual numbers are not yet decided, but be will be accompanied by a
cavalry brigade and a strong force of artillery. On the left bank a minimum force will
c ontain the Tur ks in the Hannah position. He will endeavour to defeat the Turks on the
Tight bank at position or wherever they may be found. If there should he a decisive
success the advance will be continued across Hai to west of Shumr.-uw. bend, so as to endeavour
to capture the enemy’s bridge and ships. Townshend will co-operate either by (a) crossing
to the right bank, or (6) assisting with artillery fire from the left bank, or (r)'attackino- {.he
enemy at Shum-ram bend by the left bank in co-operation with Aylmer on the ri-dit biink° ft
will depend on Aylmer’s success which of these courses Townshen 1 will adopt. °Details as to
crossing Townshend’s force and evacuating sick and wounded t . the right bank are baiite-
worked out between him and Aylmer. The supplies for Aylmer's force will be passed across
.the river by Townshend. The actual date of the movement is not yet spH led iJeiqpfrtly »
* A reply was sent as follows :— 1 Reference your 1008/416/0. 38,3/57 l(k,h February. It
appears to me that the tactical plan is sound, except that 1 do not understand how it is
proposed to cross the Hai, and should feel anxious as regards the feeding of Aylmer’s troops
A it must be dependent on Townshend being able to pass food out to him. This does not
affect my views as stated in my 38,400 of 11th February ‘ —