File 1341/1921 Pt 1 'Khorassan Intelligence Summaries 1921-1922' [‎356v] (360/1080)

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Appendix II.
e< Izvestia” published at AsMabad, November 27th, 1921.
A FIEKCE ATTACK AND A LONG DRAWN OUT SIEGE.
I propose to take an example from the history of the Russo-Japanese
war—the capture of Port Arthur by the Japanese General Nogi—and to
fashion from it a comparison.
The capture of the fortress may he divided into two distinct stages, the
first of determined attacks, all of which ended inconclusively and cost the
Japanese the most extraordinary losses. The second stage was the change
over to a laborious and slow siege of the fortress in which every rule of the
military art was employed and which resulted in time in the capture of the
objective.
How are we to regard the first method employed by the Japanese general ?
Were these attempts to storm the fortress a mistake ?
The answer to the question seems very easy at first glance. If the whole
series of attacks on Port Arthur was without result—which is a fact—if the
victims who fell were in unbelievably great numbers—and that that was so is
indisputable—the unsoundness of direct and frontal attacks is at once evident
and demands no further argument.
On the other hand, before arriving at a solution of the problem in which
the unknown figured so prominently it "would be necessary to approach it
experimentally in order to determine with absolute, or even with an approxi
mation to exactitude, the process to be employed for the reduction of the
enemy fortress. To determine this without a preliminary practical experi
ment would be impossible, in other words—what was the force required, how
strong was the fortress, what was the condition of the garrison, and so on.
ithout recourse to these considerations the solution of the problem would be
impossible.
The conditions affecting the successful termination of all wars have called
for the most rapid decisions. In the case under review an immense faith in
sacrifice was essential if the attacks on the fortress were to be profitable. A
successful result w'ould free the Japanese army for operations in other theatres
of war thereby solving one of the fundamental problems of the hour, for the
enemy, that is, the Russian army, would soon be in a position to hurl large and
better prepared forces into a distant theatre of war where it would be many
times stronger than the Japanese army.
If wetake a look at the military operations as a whole and at the condi-
W J 11C ^ Japanese army acted we must arrive at the inference
that the attacks on Port Arthur denoted the highest heroism on the part of
the army and proved its ability to advance'under huge losses. It also proved
that a decision was more possible in the conditions obtaining at the time—that
is, at the commencement of operations.
Doives db tin musiration oc the wav m wine]
our revolution presents itself to us with respect to its social problems in th
province of reconstruction With regard to this, two periods stand out ver;
?mo . ‘ • ° n< Z tile P erl0 <l approximately from the beginning oi
1918 to the spring of 1921, and, on the other hand, the period in which we ran
find ourselves, that is, from the spring of 1921.
firstperi ? d must visualise an immediate transfer to Socialisa
ou any preparatory interval wherein the old system of economics couk
be approximated to Socialist economics. We thought that by creating Stab
m us ly we could advance immediately to another system of State productive
ness and revenue. We thought we could develop our system step by step, the
hile we were conquering the old rival system. We said that our problem
was not so much an expropriation of expropriators (like the dirty methods oi
ne capitalists) as a tabulation, control, and promotion of industrial labour.