Publications, Newspaper Cuttings, Photographs and Correspondence about Persia and the Persian Gulf [‎310v] (623/879)

THE TIMES OF INDIA MAIL EDITION.
[APRIL 16, 1910.
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SATURDAY, APRIL 16 1910.
\ (The Times of India, Thursday April, 14.)
Amid the din produced by
I The Middle greater issues elsewhere, in-
East. terest in the affairs of Persia
has been drowned. But the
politics of the Middle East have again
i emerged from obscurity: they will in
creasingly challenge attention in the months
that are to come. The prime necessity of
Persia to-day is money wherewith to carry on
the administration and to introduce reforms.
• There is very little money in the country:
those who possess it are not so foolish as to
lend to the Government, be it Nationalist
or despotic. The only resource of the Per
sian Chancellor is Europe, and Russia and
1 Great Britain are perfectly willing to lend
the requisite sum, at moderate interest, pro-
’. vided reasonable guarantees are given that
: it will be honestly spent for the purposes re-
I quired. Persian politics for a year have
, really centered upon the conditions of this
loan: they are authoritatively announced.
The first condition is that the programme of
expenditure shall be submitted for British
and Russian approval; the second is that the
control of expenditure shall be supervised by
a Commission of four Persians and two Euro
peans in Persian employ; and the third is
‘ that seven French experts shall be employed
in finance administration. These are the
main conditions; the most important of the
subsidiary proposals is that a Persian gen
darmerie under foreign officers shall be or
ganised for the protection of the trade
routes. These conditions will not strike the
impartial observer as being very onerous.
They involve a certain sacrifice of full Per
sian sovereignty ; but that is indispensable
to foreign financial assistance. A bankrupt
country, involved in internal anarchy where
foreign troops do not keep the peace, cannot
dictate its own terms to the European
bourses. To advance money to a government
imbued with the idea that office is the equi-
V alent for loot, without guarantees, would be
tantamount to throwing it down a bottomless
well. The Persians have shown that they are
incapable, unaided, of restoring order on
the trade routes. Yet we think there is little
Prospect of the terms being accepted by the
Mejliss ; their promulgation will probably at
once evolve an outburst of frantic indigna-
tmn: and the Persian Government have
announced that they are prepared to consi
der no terms except those which relate to in
terest, amortisation or security. The
dominant characteristics of the Per-
| sinns who either compose or control the
। Mejliss are a morbid nationalism ; a pro-
found distrust of Russia; and overweening
conceit. There is strong hostility to a
oreign loan of any sort; there is irrecon ¬
cilable hostility to any loan conditional upon
control over the administration, however
slight. But Persia must have money: as the
only possible alternative to these conditions
the Nationalists and the Mullahs are des
perately striving to beat up an internal loan
of fifty million tomans 10,000 Persian dinars, or a gold coin of that value. . What are the pros
pects of success when the Persians distrust
each other not less than they distrust Russia ?
Meanwhile, we have only to glance at the
condition of Persia to-day to understand
what will be the position of affairs if, having
refused this offer, the Mejliss comes to the
protecting Powers at a subsequent date for
the help which it has now spurned.
The Nationalists are wroth at the continued
presence of the Russians in the North-West
ern provinces; nevertheless the arrival or
Russian troops saved Tabriz from pillage
and massacre and averted the debacle of the
Nationalist cause in Azerbaijan. The advent
of the Russian troops at Ardebil acted like
oil on a troubled sea, and checked the out
break of murder and pillage when Rahim
Khan raised the standard of Mohamed Ali.
The trade routes to the north and north-
west of Teheran are uninterrupted and safe
solely because of the presence of Russian
troops : if they were now withdrawn these dis
tricts would at once lapse into anarchy. If
we contrast the state of the northern trade
routes with those leading to the Gulf littoral
we are at once in a position to measure the
value of Russian protection and the utter
incapacity of the Persian Government with
out it. The road to Bushire through Isfahan
and Shiraz is so insecure that trade is at a
standstill, and a year ago the muleteers
transferred themselves and their pack ani
mals to the Resht-Teheran road. Kerman
trembles at the threats of a brigand chief
from Baluchistan. Inland trade in the South
is at a standstill, and will remain so until
the routes are policed by a force under Bri
tish control. Mr. David Fraser neatly sum
med up the situation when he said “The
“tranquillity in the north is due to the pre-
“sence of Russian troops: the anarchy in
“the south might be said to be due to the
“absence of Indian troops.” Quite recently
three caravans in succession were looted a
day’s march from Isfahan, which is under the
governorship of the Bakhtiari Ukani, and
the only passable route—and that a precari
ous one—from the Gulf to the interior is that
via the Karun, because it passes through
Bakhtiari-land. Any other Power in the
position of Great Britain, with her predo
minant commercial and political interests in
the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , would have policed at least
the Shiraz Road a year ago, and although
our moderation may be a fine theme for sen
timentalists, it is a very doubtful kindness
to the Persian Government, and no kindness
at all to the traders and people concerned.
We can understand the desire of the Per
sians that foreign occupation of even a por
tion of their soil shall not be prolonged over
an unnecessary day; we can readily believe
that the hand of the Russian trooper is not
the lightest. But what we cannot under
stand is the irrational nationalism which
loathes the clank of the foreign sabre, and
yet spurns the only means of silencing it.
It is reported of a French Minister, who
was besieged by an angry mob, that when
ever he endeavoured to address them he was
shouted down by cries of 11 nous faut du
sang. At last, when he obtained silence, he
shook his head sadly and said Vous avez
raison. 11 vous faut du sens, mais c’est du
sens commun. The crying need in Persia
to-day is a little common sense. Foreign in
tervention alone has prevented Persia from
lapsing into a state of absolute anarchy.
Foreign protection has saved Persia from
passing under alien rule. By foreign assist
ance alone can Persia be nursed into a stable
government. But the extent of foreign con
trol and the period during which it must be
applied can be measured alone by the promp
titude with which is enlisted and the hearti
ness with which it is accepted. Unfortu
nately between a morbid suspicion of Russia
on one side and an overblown nationalism
on the other, coupled with a childish ignor
ance of affairs and a profound suspicion oi
each other, there is little prospect of rational
guidance of Persian politics. Affairs in that
unfortunate kingdom are revolving in a
vicious circle. There can be no improve
ment until money is secured for administra
tive reform. The Mejliss will not face the
only conditions on which money can be ob
tained. Every month it delays makes the
need for money greater, and the security
offered worse. Probably the worst thing
which could happen for Persia would be to
raise the money internally. The millions
would only go, as the other millions wrung
from the people have gone, in profitless
directions, and the last state of the country
would be worse than the first. Another
danger is that Persian uncertainties are the
Honest Broker’s opportunities. Only the
other day the Berlin Vossiche Zeitung
announced that it was clear that Persians
would welcome a German loan as a relief
from intolerable Anglo-Russian pressure. A
leading London journal once asked how it
was that in China German financiers would
accept greater risks than English and Ameri
can financial Corporations. To those ac
quainted with German policy in the Far
East the answer is extremely simple—Ger
many will never permit the interests of her
subjects to suffer—and the Chinese Govern
ment know it. A German loan to Persia
might be accompanied by no conditions ex
cept those relating to interest, amortisation
and security. But it would ultimately be
far more expensive and burdensome than
any terms Great Britain and Russia might
impose. The intrigues of the Berlin finan
ciers for a foothold in Teheran must be
reckoned amongst the constant factors in the
situation. Fortunately the agreement
between Great Britain and Russia is firm
and absolute. If the chaos in Persia is
prolonged, the most elementary considera
tion of British interests demands that more
active measures shall be taken in the South,
and at least the Bushire-Shiraz road effect
ively policed.
to the interior is that
via the Karun, because it passes through
(The Timex of India, Thursday April, 14.)
Amid the din produced by
The Middle
East.
politics of the
greater issues elsewhere, in
terest in the affairs of Persia
has been drowned. But the
Middle East have again
obscurity: they will in-
emerged from .
creasingly challenge attention in the months
that are to come. The prime necessity of
Persia to-day is money wherewith to carry on
the administration and to introduce reforms.
There is very little money in the country :
those who possess it are not so foolish as to
lend to the Government, be it Nationalist
1
or despotic. The only resource of the
sian Chancellor is Europe, and Russia
Great Britain are perfectly willing to
the requisite sum, at moderate interest,
vided reasonable guarantees are given
Per-
and
lend
pro-
that
it will be honestly spent for the purposes re
quired. Persian politics for a year have
really centered upon the conditions of this
loan: they arc authoritatively announced.
The first condition is that the programme of
expenditure shall be submitted for British
and Russian approval; the second is that the
control of expenditure shall be supervised by
a Commission of four Persians and two Euro
peans in Persian employ; and the third is
that seven French experts shall be employed
in finance administration. These are the
main conditions ; the most important of the
subsidiary proposals is that a Persian gen
darmerie under foreign officers shall be or
ganised for the protection of the trade
routes. These conditions will not strike the
impartial observer as being very onerous.
They involve a certain sacrifice of full Per
sian sovereignty ; but that is indispensable
to foreign financial assistance. A bankrupt
country, involved in internal anarchy where
foreign troops do not keep the peace, cannot
dictate its own terms to the European
bourses. To advance money to a government
imbued with the idea that office is the equi
valent for loot, without guarantees, would be
tantamount to throwing it down a bottomless
well. The Persians have shown that they are
incapable, unaided, of restoring order on
the trade routes. Yet we think there is little
prospect of the terms being accepted by the
Mejliss; their promulgation will probably at
once evolve an outburst of frantic indigna
tion : and the Persian Government have
announced that they are prepared to consi-
| der no terms except those which relate to in
terest, amortisation or security,
dominant characteristics of the
The
Per-
sinus who either compose or control the
I Mejliss are a morbid nationalism ; a pro-
| found distrust of Russia : and overweening
conceit. There is strong hostility to a
foreign loan of any sort; there is irrecon-
Bakhtiari-land. Any other Power in the
position of Great Britain, with her predo
minant commercial and political interests in
the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , would have policed at least
the Shiraz Road a year ago, and although
our moderation may be a fine theme for sen
timentalists, it is a very doubtful kindness
to the Persian Government, and no kindness
at all to the traders and people concerned.
We can understand the desire of the Per
sians that foreign occupation of even a por
tion of their soil shall not be prolonged over
an unnecessary day ; we can readily believe
that the hand of the Russian trooper is not
the lightest. But what we cannot under-
si
U.
00
te
at
Ke
oi
00
in
ax
-9
stand is the irrational nationalism which
loathes the clank of the foreign sabre, and
yet spurns the only means of silencing it.
It is reported of a French Minister, who
was besieged by an angry mob, that when
ever he endeavoured to address them he was
shouted down by cries of 11 nous faut du
sang. At last, when he obtained silence, he
shook his head sadly and said Vous avez
raison. Il vous faut du sens 9 mais c’est du
sens commun. The crying need in Persia
to-day is a little common sense. Foreign in
tervention alone has prevented Persia from
lapsing into a state of absolute anarchy.
Foreign protection has saved Persia from
passing under alien rule. By foreign assist
ance alone can Persia be nursed into a stable
government. But the extent of foreign con
trol and the period during which it must be
applied can be measured alone by the promp
titude with which is enlisted and the hearti
ness with which it is accepted. Unfortu
nately between a morbid suspicion of Russia
on one side and an overblown nationalism
is
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on the other, coupled with a childish ignor- d
ance of affairs and a profound suspicion of
each other, there is little prospect of rational
guidance of Persian politics. Affairs in that
unfortunate kingdom are revolving in a
U
OMT-
09341
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pad.
UT •
eind
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A
vicious circle. There can be no improve- -
ment until money is secured for administra- 0)
tive reform. The Mejliss will not face the 04
only conditions on which money can be ob y
tained. Every month it delays makes the ue
need for money greater, and the security
offered worse. Probably the worst thing
which could happen for Persia would be to
raise the money internally. The millions
would only go, as the other millions wrung
from the people have gone, in profitless
directions, and the last state of the country
would be worse than the first. Another
danger is that Persian uncertainties are the
Honest Broker’s opportunities. Only the
other day the Berlin Vossiche Zeifung
announced that it was clear that Persians
would welcome a German loan as a relief
from intolerable Anglo Russian pressure. A
-IV
‘A
HUB