The Fortnightly Review: No. CCCCLXIII, New Series [‎582r] (54/239)

THE BATTLE OF THE SEA OF JAPAN.
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should have been a draw, with the advantage slightly in favour
of Admiral Togo. The history of the naval struggle since the
dramatic opening of February 28th of last year has served to
completely unmask the virtue of those mechanical comparisons
between the strength of rival fleets which it is so easy
to make and which events are so swift to expose. Russia
began the war with a fleet thrice as strong as that of Japan,
but it was widely distributed, while Japan’s forces were concen
trated. On the eve of the war the present w r riter, examining
the basis on which Russian naval prestige rested, concluded that
under the circumstances in which the Russian Fleet has been
created, there is consequently good cause to wonder whether it will
prove in action as formidable as it appears on paper.” 1 This
scepticism has been more than completely justified, although
eighteen months ago those who held that the Japanese Navy
could sweep the Russian Fleet off the seas were very few in
number, and most observers pointed to the ” might of Russia”
which w y as in reserve. Public opinion had been impressed by the
measures taken by Russia to increase the number of her ships in
the Pacific, and had failed to divine the essential truth that with
the advance in the application of science to naval warfare the
personal element, instead of being eliminated, has gained added
importance. Neither battleship, cruiser, nor torpedo vessel is an
automatic machine for dealing out death or destruction. Naval
power does not consist in the mere investment of treasure in mobile
sea fortresses, and victory at sea does not necessarily lie with the
country which has the longest purse, the greatest number of able-
bodied males in the population, or even the highest financial
credit. Sea power is a delicate combination of forces which cannot
be purchased with money alone; it consists in the provision of the
best-tried weapons, and the patient training in their efficient use of
officers and men who have the three essential characteristics—the
fighting edge, an aptitude for technique, and the sea habit.
Japan entered upon this war with one of the smallest fleets in
the world. At no time has Admiral Togo had at his command half
as many battleships as answer to the slightest word of Admiral Sir
Arthur Wilson in the English Channel, nor as many as are under
^ ice-Admiral Sir W. H. May with his Atlantic Fleet based upon
Gibraltar, or Lord Charles Beresford with his tw T o squadrons of
battleships in the Mediterranean. Japan began the struggle with
a fleet about one-fourth the size of the navy of Italy, and
ridiculously small in comparison with the navies of France, Russia,
and Germany. With six battleships and eight armoured cruisers
the officers and men of the Japanese Fleet, supported by torpedo
(1) Cassier's Magazine, February, 1904.