The Fortnightly Review: No. CCCCLXIII, New Series [‎582v] (55/239)

24
THE BATTLE OF THE SEA OF JAPAN.
craft and scouts, have swept from off the Far Eastern seas every
single vessel flying the Russian ensign. It was Nelson’s dictum
that “numbers only can annihilate.” These words were written
in the old sailing days, when ships fought side by side, and the
crew T s engaged in hand-to-hand contests ; and if there is one moi al
more than another to be drawn from the great victories won by
the Japanese, it is that this saying of the great British sea captain
is no longer applicable to modern conditions. If numbers could
have annihilated, Japan at this moment should be under the heel
of the Tsar.
The battle of the Sea of Japan, as Admiral Togo has officially
styled it, occurred after a period of many months of anticipation
and speculation. From August 14th, when Admiral Rojdestvensky
hoisted his flag in the Kniaz Suvaroff, down to the opening of the
fight in the Tsushima Straits, the progress of his squadron from
the Far West to the Far East fascinated the world. It straggled
out in detachments, and when, early in May, the last instalment
of the outgoing fleet, under Admiral Niebogatoff, effected its junc
tion with the main body under Admiral Rojdestvensky off the coast
of Indo-China, naval opinion, irrespective of its sympathies with
the one or the other belligerent, acclaimed in terms of high praise
the achievement of the Russian Admiral in taking his great
heterogeneous and unruly armada within strategical touch of the
Japanese forces. Never had an admiral been entrusted with a
task of the kind fraught with so many difficulties, and whatever
epitaph history may write on the Russian admiral as a war com
mander, nothing can rob him of the credit due to his unparalleled
success as a leader of men and a resourceful and dogged sailor.
Attended by nearly fifty steamships, including an immense number
of transports and other auxiliaries, and a curious assortment of
obsolescent and obsolete men-of-war, Admiral Rojdestvensky
steamed past Formosa to a point not far distant from Shanghai,
where he detached a portion of his auxiliaries, and in high hope of
victory because he had the ‘ ‘ numbers ’ ’ with which to
annihilate,’ turned to make a dash for Vladivostock through the
Straits of Tsushima. He may or may not have known that
Admiral Togo had lost one of his best battleships a year previously,
and that the number of units of this class at his command was only
four in addition to eight armoured cruisers. It is certain that the
Russian admiral over-estimated the fighting value of the materiel
which constituted his fleet, and failed to understand the subtle
combination of the human element and the gun and torpedo which
constitutes naval power. There seems no doubt that Admiral
Rojdestvensky and his officers entered on the final contest with
high hopes. He made the fatal mistake of valuing too highly his