The Fortnightly Review: No. CCCCLXIII, New Series [‎612v] (115/239)

84
THE MISSION TO CABUL.
therefore, may be held to embody the final form of the agreement
which Sir Louis Dane secured from the Amir, although there is
reason to believe that other and more important papers are in
existence.
It is not to be supposed that the terms which Sir Louis Dane
was authorised to secure wmuld have provided more than a partial
removal of the difficulties as they exist between India and Afghan
istan. The acceptance of the treaty by the Amir would, of
course, have done much to clear the situation, but there is no
doubt that long prior to the departure of the Mission, matters, as
between India and Afghanistan, had practically reached a point
where the kindly offices of Government should cease and war
begin. The policy of meeting the existing situation by friendly
missions is useless. Half measures are no longer expedient, and
steps should be taken at once to extract from the Amir of Afghan
istan his compliance with our very just demands. If the Govern
ment hesitated to put into practice against Afghanistan measures
which must have precipitated a rupture of a definite and irre
vocable character, it would have been more in consonance with
our position had the invitation from the Amir been declined.
The measures properly suited to the situation in Afghanistan
should bring about the complete subjection of Afghanistan to
British control, or plunge the Government of India into war with
the Amir. There is no doubt that the present time is more
opportune for such action than it is ever likely to be again. The
risk of Bussian intervention at this juncture is of the slightest,
while the trained troops of India would inflict a salutary and
veiy necessary lesson upon the armed rabble of Afghanistan.
Terrible as the consequences of war may be, there must come a
point in the affairs of States when the arbitrament of the sword
is the only possible expedient, and such a moment has arrived
on the Indian frontier in connection with Afghanistan. Unfortu
nately, in spite of much evidence to the contrary, few believe
readily that there is no ground for placing any reliance whatever
upon the benevolent offices of the Amir. Yet this is so much a
fact that the Viceroy of India himself advocates the strongest
coercive measures in order to determine the end of an impossible
situation. Unhappily the Imperial Government, fearing to incur
the lisk of war and frightened at the character of the measures
which the Viceroy of India supports, hesitated, preferring the
patchwork adjustment which the despatch of a mission rendered
possible to the more forcible steps which the situation in reality
demands. A fatal blunder, of course, has been perpetrated, the
consequences of which will remain in Central Asia long after the
visit of the Mission has been forgotten.
Angus Hamilton.