The Fortnightly Review: No. CCCCLXIII, New Series [‎612r] (114/239)

THE MISSION TO GABEL.
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safe enough until Afghanistan and Persia have passed away, by
■ which time it will be patent that “ the construction of strategic
railways in Afghanistan by Russia ’ ’ should not have been the sole
factor determining British policy in our buffer State.
From the moment that the copy of the treaty, which had been
drawm up by the advisers of the Amir, had been handed to the
British Mission, the treatment accorded to the members of the
Mission itself changed. While the treaty w 7 as in process of
being transmitted to India, and forwarded from India to London,
the interval at Cabul was occupied with the exchange of an
elaborate correspondence between the principal advisers of the
Amir’s Government and the Chief of the Mission, the marked
rudeness of which, upon the part of the Afghans, would have been
sufficient justification for the summary breaking off of negotia
tions. Unfortunately, through the absence of adequate powers,
the Mission had to await the decision of the Imperial Govern
ment upon the Amir’s treaty, and when, in place of the order
for the immediate withdrawal of the Mission, Mr. Brodrick
sent instructions that the treaty, as arranged by the
Amir, should be signed, it seemed as if the Mission had fallen
into the pit which had been prepared for it. The attitude of
the officials became even more insolent, the insulting demeanour
of Nazrulla Khan indicating, upon every public occasion, a current
of hostility which bodes badly for the reputation of the British
raj in Afghanistan. Indeed, the feeling at Cabul among the
officials of the Amir, and manifested equally by the great bulk of
the inhabitants, was opposed to the Mission. Throughout this
trying period matters passed gradually from bad to worse, the
questionable courtesy of the Ministers becoming the scandal of the
Cabul bazaars, and echoing far and wide throughout the regions
of Asia. The culminating feature of a disastrous situation had
still to be endured, and it may be said to have arrived w r hen the
Mission was informed that the Amir had changed his mind, and
that the version of the treaty to which the Imperial Govern
ment had agreed was to be replaced by another. When this
second agreement was produced, the difference between the new
treaty and the old was of such a character that Sir Louis
Dane declined to sign, a proceeding which was very proper,
and earned the support of his immediate following. Instead
of maintaining his position, how r ever, and withdrawing from a
situation covering all concerned in it with humiliation, he oscil
lated between the attractions of bringing home a treaty, however
ineffectual, and risking the complete rupture of relations with
Afghanistan, finally deciding to attach his signature to the docu
ment as a precautionary measure, and conditional upon its ultimate
acceptance bv the Imperial Government. The treaty as published,
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