The Fortnightly Review: No. CCCCLXIII, New Series [‎665v] (221/239)

CORRESPONDENCE.
THE BATTLE OF THE SEA OF JAPAN AND PEACE.
To the Editor of the Fortnightly Review.
Sir,— Japan’s paramountcy, after the recent sea-battle, carries with
it as an inevitable corollary the proclamation of a new Monroe
Doctrine for Eastern Asia. Just as the United States has taken the
American hemisphere under her wing to protect it against Eu
ropean aggression, so Japan will take the Asiatic Powers which
are still independent and give them her support to progress along
their own lines. The new Monroe Doctrine will not be formally
declared; the case of Russia in Manchuria is a clear enough signpost
to the world. Hands off China, Korea, and Siam is the watch
word of the day, and Japan is able to enforce her Monroe Doctrine
more efficiently than can the United States. The Powers have so
often piously expressed themselves anxious to secure the integrity
of China that they should be glad now that this integrity has
obtained a strong and efficient guardian. There is no yellow peril
in the new Monroe Doctrine any more than there is an American
peril in the doctrine of President Monroe. The status quo is to be
maintained, and those European nations which own parts of China
have nothing to fear from Japan so long as they behave themselves
and do not think that acquiescence in the status quo means lack of
readiness to check aggression. Germany is safe in Kiao-chau, but
it would be well not to try and absorb the Shantung province.
Japan’s Monroe Doctrine is a menace to none save the evil-doers,
and in many ways it is a self-denying ordinance, since, if land
grabbing were to be allowed, which nation could hope to secure so
many tit-bits as Japan? The new Monroe Doctrine may well be
equally as annoying to Europe as is the attitude of the United
States to South America, but it is in no manner to be construed
into a world menace. It is simply a matter which has to be accepted,
and in the future there will be a new and strange morality observable
in the dealings of the Great Powers with Far Eastern nations.
Great as have been the results of the battle of the Japan Sea
upon the international situation, it must be confessed that they
have had little direct effect upon the ending of the war. To the
Russian mind the Baltic Fleet was a sporting chance—scarcely a
serious part of the campaign. There are, indeed, many who believe
that originally the fleet was intended rather in the nature of a bluff
than anything else. Its value lay not so much in its fighting power
as in its affording to the Russians an asset in negotiation. Admiral
Togo’s masterly inaction, however, lured the Russian Armada too
far for retreat, and it was annihilated. The Russian feeling may be
summed up in the words of a prominent Russian diplomat, who
may later be one of the plenipotentiaries for the discussion of terms
of peace. He said: “ If Rozhdestvensky wins it is bad for Japan;
if he loses, it is no worse for us than we are now. M^e stand to win
if he is victorious. Japan does not come any nearer winning if he
is defeated. For things will remain on the sea just as they have