The Fortnightly Review: No. CCCCLXIII, New Series [‎666r] (222/239)

CORRESPONDENCE.
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be decided ” h6 begilming ' Alld ifc is not on 9ea t ha t the issue will
This being the case, the annihilation ol the fleet, although annov-
mg and amazing, could not be expected to exercise a great effect upon
Kussia in producing a desire for peace at once. The Japanese, on
the other hand, expected to defeat the Russian Fleet, and, therefore
the happening of the expected has not altered their determination
to secure their object. It has facilitated their operations and has
laid bare all of Russia’s Far Eastern possessions, but it has not
altered at all the Japanese terms of peace. It must be remembered
that Japan is fighting for peace and future security, and not at all
for gain and annexation; therefore, continued successes do not aug
ment the demands to be made from Russia. The Japanese terms
are a fixed quantity, and do not contain clauses expressly included
in order to be cut out in negotiating. It is a case of all the cards
being on the table and Japan having all the winning ones. Victories
make no difference in the terms; they only facilitate Japan’s ob-
tainment of them. M. Witte is reported to have told an interviewer
that Japan, of course, would not think of concluding peace unless
it were assured for fifty years. She will undoubtedly refuse to begin
negotiations except in Japan with a person furnished with special
powers. Russia could, of course, drag on the war for five years
with the possibility of success if it were not for internal events, to
which the Government remains obstinately deaf and blind. And
that is what I consider really terrible about Russia’s present position.
Every hour’s delay brings us lower and lower.” Remarkable words
for a Russian to utter, and yet M. Witte has struck nearer the mark
than many who have much better opportunities for observation.
Japan’s terms have been dealt with in a previous article, but may
be briefly summarised here:—The absolute evacution of Manchuria
by the Russians, and the handing back of the provinces to China;
the cession to Japan of the Russian lease of the Kwantung Peninsula,
with possibly a reversion to the conditions of the peace terms after
the Chinese War; the cession of the entire Manchurian railway to
Japan, and its handing over to an international company; the Russo-
Chinese Bank to be regarded as a Government concern, and all its
concessions disallowed; a free hand for Japan in Korea, and no
Russian interference; the transformation of Vladivostock into a com
mercial port, and the prohibition of dockyards or Naval stations in
the Far East; the handing over of the interned Russian war vessels
was originally desired, but may be waived in deference of the value
of there being some sort of a Russian Fleet in the Baltic. The island
of Sakhalin is to be ceded to Japan together with fishing rights
along the coasts of the Ussuri Province and Kamtchatka. Russia
must pay an indemnity of at least £ 100 , 000 , 000 , and this sum may
increase if the war be prolonged. Theoretical or paper undertakings
by Russia Japan does not desire, having tested their value in the
past; all concessions have to be on the practical plane. Manchuria
will be thrown open to the trade of the world under Chinese ad
ministration; indeed, it is by placing it upon an international plane
that Japan hopes to secure an effective barrier against future Russian
aggression. Except for the cession of Sakhalin, the railway, and
the indemnity, the Japanese terms of peace do not touch Russian
nroperty, and it is not too much to say that these three demands