The Fortnightly Review: No. CCCCLXIII, New Series [‎611v] (113/239)

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THE MISSION TO CABUL.
members of the Mission were admitted to audience. Through
out this period it may be presumed that the Amir kept in touch
with the progress of the discussion, for, although his principal
advisers, with whom it had become increasingly difficult to
negotiate, recognised the isolated position in which Afghanistan
was placed, and refused to entertain the suggestion of the intro
duction of the telegraph to Cabul, the extension of the railway
to Dakka, or the reorganisation of the military resources, it is
doubtful whether they would have rejected such proposals upon
their own responsibility.
Oddly enough, and in contrast to the position taken up by
the advisers of the Amir, behind whom the prevailing influence
was that of the Shahgasi and the Amir’s brother, Nazrulla Khan,
there is a tendency to look to India for assistance against the
possible encroachments of Kussia in the north-west and north
east, although their solicitude for the interests of Afghanistan
does not extend to the efficient preparation of their own resources
nor to the reorganisation of the fighting forces of Afghanistan
under British officers. In fact, each one of the proposals dis
cussed with the advisers of the Amir was negatived, the ministers
evidently taking their cue from the attitude of the Amir himself.
Under such circumstances, while it may be questioned whether,
in the history of Asiatic politics, a British Mission has met with
such a rebuff as that which has occurred in Cabul, it is certain
that there is little which can defend the wisdom of accepting
responsibility for the integrity of Afghanistan against the invasion
of Russia when all facilities for such a purpose are deliberately
withheld. As the condition of affairs stands now, it is not im
probable that the Afghans w^ould be pleased to permit Anglo-
Indian forces to come to their assistance, once their own powers
of resistance had been broken down, while, in the meantime, they
deny us vigorously the possession of any point of advantage in
the country itself, a consummation which is not quite that towards
which our diplomacy has been directed. Against such an attitude
of arrogant isolation it behoves the Imperial Government to assert
its ow r n authority by the occupation of the northern frontier
of Afghanistan, less as a precaution against the invasion of India
than as a solution of a situation in which our own position is
quite untenable. Afghanistan is the immediate, and Persia the
ultimate, objective of Russian expansion in Central Asia to-day,
and I doubt whether India enters into the range of Russia’s prac
tical activity. The aim of Russian policy is inefficiently appre
ciated by politicians in England, the spokesmen of the Imperial
Government itself observing the trend of events by much noisy
outcry about the safety of India. British action in Afghanistan,
and not the Russian invasion of India, is the problem. India is