"سجل نهائي لمقابلة عُقدت في وزارة الخارجية يوم الأربعاء ٥ أكتوبر [١٩٣٣] لمناقشة العلاقات بين حكومة بريطانيا وشيخ الكويت" [و‎‎٧] (٥٠/١٣)

7.
COLO lEL POITLE expressed the vie™ that there did not
seem to be any IntermediPte position possible between a
treaty relationship with the jheikh on the present lines
and a full Protectorate. The sheikh would certainly be
unwilling to agree to the sheikhdom becoming a formed
protectorate, and En.m- faci£, he (Colonel lowle) was iiot
much in favour of it. Ke screed, however, that it would
be advisable on suitable opportunities, to try to tighten
up our control over the Sheikh.
On being Questioned whether he did not consider that
our restricted Position vis-a-vis of the Sheikh in regard
to the oweit oil concession indicated the essential weak
ness of our treaty position, he replied that our difficul
ties in that case had been due rather to the special
undertakings given to the United States Government in that
natter than to any weakness in our normal control over the
Sheikh under the treaty engagements. Had we been able,
without violating our pledges to the United States Govern
ment, to tell the Sheikh that we required him to give the
concession to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company he would have
done so.
MR. RENDEL drew attention to the fact that in the
event of serious misgovernment by the Kuler of Koweit such
as prejudicially to affect foreign citizens in Koweit we
might find ourselves in a difficult position vis-a-vis
the foreign power concerned. Ml?. LAITHWAITE said that
on this noint he thought that Bahrain might be regarded as
locus clasjil_cus. '. e had for many years put up with a
considerable degree of misgovernment by Sheikh Isa. But
when conditions at last in our view became intolerable we
did not hesitate to intervene and to depose the Sheikh.
Ihere