"سجل نهائي لمقابلة عُقدت في وزارة الخارجية يوم الأربعاء ٥ أكتوبر [١٩٣٣] لمناقشة العلاقات بين حكومة بريطانيا وشيخ الكويت" [و‎‎٩] (٥٠/١٧)

9o
IHR* RENDEL pointed out that the Arabian air route was
likely to develop quicklyo If Iraq were to adopt an anti^
foreign policy, and Koweit became correspondingly more
important as a centre of international traffic, other
countries might well wish to take advantage of the
facilities there. We might well find many foreign Powers
becoming increasingly interested in Koweit. We could not
have it both ways, and should sooner or later have to
define our position. His Majesty's Government ought,
therefore, to orient their policy definitely either towards
the greater independence of the Sheikhdom or towards a
tightening of their own control„
MR. LAITHV/AITE agreed and added that, in his view,
our policy should he directed towards a closer control t
but that it was undesirable to hasten any overt declara
tion of full control, such as the establishment of a
protectorate would be. Such a declaration might well
frighten the Sheikhs of Bahrain and of the Trucial Coast
and do more harm than goodo The policy to be followed
was, therefore, one of occasional minor adjustments, as
these became necessary, tending to increase, or at any
rate not to relax, our control over the Sheikhdom.
Reverting to the question of Saudi-Koweiti relations,
Sj.R RYxla drew attention to the toleration extended
by His Majesty's Government to direct correspondence on
business matters between the Sheikh and Ibn Saud, This,
no less than the independence formula, placed us in a weak
position in defending Koweit, and the correspondence in
question was of such long standing that it was difficult
now for us to take the line that Ibn Saud should write to
us rather than to the Sheikh* What was desirable was that