"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎٤] (٤٢٤/٢١٣)

CHAPTER XIIL
Comments on the Battle of Dujaiia, 8t!i March 1916.
(E efeeence M ap 6.)
For a detailed study of the battle of Dujaiia the student is referred!
to Major-General Sir W. I). Bird's book " A Chapter of Misfortunes."
The battle is an interesting one. Not only tactically, and in its bold
conception and plan for attacking an entrenched position from a distance
of 10 miles, but also in that it was really the decisive action relative-
to the fall of Kut. It thereby involved a chain of consequences which
led to strategic decisions of great importance; necessitating the-
employment in this theatre of war of a force whose eventual ration,
strength was little under half a million.
It seems that an initial mistake, which was to have a profound effect
on the operations, was made here. Points to be noted are the splitting
^ . up of formations ; centralized control ol very wide-
Organization. j . 1 . _ J
spread movements with most inadequate means
of communication, and the extremely detailed nature of the orders
which apparently had a paralysing effect on some of the subordinate
commanders.
The force for the decisive operations (Columns ' A J and ' B J ) consis
ted of brigades from three different formations, who had never worked
together before. Moreover, the 37th Brigade whose function was to co
operate from the east (Column 4 B ') was not placed under Major-
General Kemball's orders for the attack.
The Commander of this force was not known to his troops nor were^
his staff ; the latter were hastily collected with no previous experi
ence of working together and with very little time for preparation.
The selection of General Kemball may have been influenced by his .
previous knowledge of the country. The qualities ot dash and vigour
in the attack which he had shown at Shaikh Saad and the Wadi were^
just those required for the contemplated operation. Yet, unless the
personal factor was overwhelming, it is difficult to understand why the-
3rd Division was not used for the decisive attack. No splitting up of
formations would then have been necessary. This was a well-tried
Division with a year's experience of fighting in France, with its own
artillery, and fully organized and staffed.
One further point in organization.
It is suggested that the whole of tLis force (9th, 28th, 36th and 37th-
Infantry Brigades, with necessary E. A., R. E., etc.) to which was en
trusted the operation on which success or failure depended, should have
been put under one Commander with an augmented Divisional Staff..
( ISO )