"ملف (19/191 IV (C 103 مطالبة الفُرس بالبحرين" [ظ‎‎١‎١‎٥] (٦٨١/٢٣٠)

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the International Cart of Justice. Alternatively the
Asaerably coulcl, by the 8fui« majority, bring the. matter
to the notice of the Security Council as being "likely
to endanger international peace and security" (Article
ii(s))* T 1 >
.
4 # For a direct approach to the Security Council
Itersia need only claim that the maintenance of ^
international peace and security is threatened by V
the continuance of tha dispute,. (Articles 34 and 5^ (1)).
We cannot prevent the Council frcm investigating thir
contentionnor, if it admtte it, fron proceeding to ^
reconmend terms of settlemant or refer the case to the
International Court. We camot exclude the jjossibility,
remote as it may seem, that Bsrsia might engineer a
situation in which the Security Council would feel called
upon to make some recommend a tiuni but she would have to
obtain seven votes, including those of the remaining
Great Powers, Any subsequent reccranendation or reference
to the Court would need a similar majority, but this »ouid
presumably be obtained if the earlier one had been.
Neither we nor Ifersia would have any vote at this stage
and we would have no ■veto" on the Council's decisions
at any stage abort of enforcement action agaiaat ua. If
Feraia were a xaember of the Council, she would have a vote
at the enforcement stage but no "veto"* If Persia's
contention that the matter was one affecting 'peace and
Security' were not admitted, it is perhaps unlikely
that the Council would deal with it further and in any
case it could then only make reccxmendaticns for a
pacific settlement upon the request of both parties.
5 # whatever the procedure adopted, a decision
or recctiinendation unfavourable to us on the part
of Assembly, Council, or Court would place.ua in a
disastrous dilanma. A recommendation by the Assembly
/or