"السياسة في الشرق الأوسط. I. مذكرة بقلم المقدم السير مارك سايكس." [و‎‎١‎٠‎١] (١٤/٣)

Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes.
SECTION' 1.
-MILITARY SITU A TICK IX MESOPOTAMIA.
\\ ith reganl to the situation in Mesopotamia there are two aspects the
one political, the other military.
' ' () ' 11 ^ 11 ' 111 {11'aiy point of view I think the reinforcement of the Armv
and the occupation ol Baghdad are the two most important considerations.
As marfers now stand, our Army is weak in numbers and grows propor
tionately weaker as the enemy gradually recuperates and reinforces at
Baghdad, until he is strong enough to advance in force. It cannot be too
strongly urged that a single defeat is sufficient to procure the destruction
of our whole force. The population would undoubtedly rise en masse to
plunder and harass our retirement if once they imagined we had turned our
backs, and 1 personally doubt whether we should be able to withdraw to
Basra under such circumstances. Whether we decide to occupy Baghdad
or not, 1 am certain that the reinforcement of a full division is the least that
the situation demands.
If ue occupy Baghdad. 1 think that the military situation is much easier
than before, and that, we should feel the strain less for the following reasons.
Once Baghdad is ours the enemy's facilities for concentration previous to
attack are reduced. Thus so long as he holds Baghdad he can dribble his
reinforcements simultaneously into Baghdad by the Euphrates, Tigris, and
by the Kifri road he can concentrate at Baghdad, and with the help of
steamers and current advance with a fairly large force.
I f we hold Baghdad the enemy must either disperse his forces or
concentrate at a point on one of the three lines, and use that line only for
supply, with the result that the concentration of a large force will be more
difficult for him to accomplish, and his subsequent advance easier to
check.
If one makes a deduction of 2,000 men for the maintenance of order in
Baghdad, the number of troops required to meet the enemy, if he is based
North of Baghdad, would be less than if we and he maintain our present
respective positions.
1 visited the dockyard at Abadan and saw the work in progress. One
boat is ready, and five more are in course of construction, and should be
able to take the water at intervals of live weeks from 1st November. There
are many difficulties in the way of construction which appear irremediable;
shortage of labour, difficulties of ground, and climate conspire to make the *
work slow and difficult.
From what I saw of the operations up stream 1 should imagine that the
gunboats should be very valuable, but 1 think that they should have a larger
ammunition supply, 200 rounds for the 4-inch being quite inadequate when
it is remembered how many shots are inevitably wasted in a country when-
targets are so doubtful and scattered as in Mesopotamia. The low trajectory
of the 4-inch gun presents certain grave disadvantages when the gunboat
has to be used in narrow waters and between high banks against enemies at
medium ranges. I suggest that the Inventions Department might consider
the problem of devising a suitable weapon, or mounting for an existing
weapon, which could enable a shell to be landed accurately on a given point
on a plain about 1,500 yards from a gun fired from the deck of a vessel
at a point in a river 30 yards from a bank, 15 feet in height above the
water line.