"مذكرة بقلم العقيد كورنواليز حول السياسة المستقبلية لحكومة بريطانيا بخصوص الإعانات المالية المقدّمة لزعماء شبه الجزيرة العربية." [ظ‎‎١] (٨/٢)

arbitration award delivered by Lord Canning, Viceroy of India in 1861, and a
lurther sum ol 100,000 rupees approved in 1911 in connection with the agreement
lor the regulation ol the arms traffic. The modification of the former sum is scarcely
possible under any circumstances, but the reduction of the latter might be considered
by the India Office and the Government of India from the point of view of the desira
bility ol reducing this subsidy to its true proportion in comparison with the subsidies
which will be granted to more powerful chiefs.
(ii.) SJiehr and Mokalla. —The nominal stipend of 720 rupees per annum is
paid to the Sultan in accordance with the terms of his treaty in 1882. It is not
considered necessary to increase this amount since the Sultan was granted a loan of
400,000 rupees in 1917.
(iii.) Anazeh. —Fahad Beg Ibn Hadhdhal is paid 17,000 rupees per mensem from
Mesopotamian revenues in return for certain specified services, and his case is there-
lore outside the scope of the present memorandum except in so far as his subsidy is
likely to be taken as a standard by other chiefs and compared to the detriment of the
amounts which will be offered to them.
(iy.) Aden. —The stipends, amounting to 70,000 rupees per annum, are paid to
the chiefs of the protectorate chiefly by virtue of treaty rights, and cannot therefore
be reduced or cancelled so long as His Majesty's Government maintain a hold over
the protectorate. It is not, however, suggested that they should be increased.
(v.) Sejd. —The subsidy to Ibn Saud has been paid as a matter of policy and
not in fulfilment of a treaty obligation. The question of its reduction is discussed
later.
It will be seen that, setting aside the subsidies to Ibn Saud and Fahad Beg,
British obligations at present amount to 257.120 rupees per annum, and that the
subsidy paid to the Sultan of Muscat is the only one which is susceptible of
modification.
6.—(c.) The manner in which the balance of the provisional sum of 100,000/.
can best be divided.
His Majesty's Government are now faced with the double task of substantially
reducing their financial commitments in Arabia, and at the same time of securing
the special position for which the good-will of the chiefs is as necessary as is the
consent ot the Principal Allied Powers. This task will be rendered more difficult
by the policy which has been pursued in the past. The exaggerated scale on which
subsidies have up to now been calculated has, indeed, given rulers like King Hussein
and Ibn Saud such an undue idea of their own value that the greatest care and tact
will have to be exercised in making them realise that the reduced rate at which it is
proposed to subsidise them in future carries with it no disparagement and that it is
due, not to a dimunition in confidence or friendship, but to the inevitable transition
from war conditions to those of peace.
Ibn Saud, in particular, may prove difficult to deal with since he has been
pressing for an increase for many months and, in the opinion of Sir Percy Cox, who
lias recommended that his subsidy should be increased to 100,000/. per annum, is in
serious monetary difficulties. In this connection, it will be remembered that fears of
a similar nature were entertained last year when the question of reducing the subsidy
to King Hussein was discussed. These forebodings, however, did not prove true,
since the King's subsidy was not only reduced from 100,000/. to 25,000/. in three
months, but was altogether discontinued from the end of February last without
causing more than a slight aggravation of his fancied grievances. This precedent
may not be without value in forecasting the attitude of Ibn Saud, the drastic
reduction of whose subsidy is a necessary preliminary to the introduction of the new
policy, for the reason that it approximates to the total which is available for division
amongst all the chiefs.
7. In his and other cases, it is submitted that the best way of disarming criticism
is by making a frank explanation of the situation, coupled with assurances of
continued friendship and an indication of the many benefits which any small State
must receive by the mere fact of being in treaty relations with and enjoying the
protection and support of His Majesty's Government. This may not be appreciated
at its full worth in the first instance, but practical evidence can be given in the future
by a readiness to assist in other ways. These would, from a financial point of view,
consist chiefly in fostering trade, in developing the prosperity of Arabian ports by
such steps as inducing steamship companies to call and in taking other measures
which might lead to an increase in revenue without burdening the British taxpayer.
8. A factor of more immediate importance, and one on which the success of the