"مسألة الشرق الأوسط أو بعض المشكلات السياسية المتعلقة بدفاع الهند" [ظ‎‎١‎٨‎٦] (٦١٦/٣٧٧)

298 THE BALANCE OF POWER IN PERSIA
iv -
be applied to a dynasty backed by the material support
of such a power as Russia. On the contrary, there are
abundant indications that some of those who are most
disaffected to the present regime are looking forward to
the day when, the Shah and his ministers having played
out the part for which they are at present cast, Russia
will throw them overboard and assume direct control
over the government of the country. Similar influences
are at work even among the Bakhtiaris and in other
remote parts of the Shah's dominions where his writ
has hitherto seldom run without dispute. Behind the
centralising activity of Teheran the hand of Russia is
felt to be pressing heavily, and her hand may be pro
pitiated but cannot be resisted.
In a word, Russia is reaping to-day the results of
a carefully thought-out, consistent, and persevering
policy, carried out by a staff of highly trained officials,
specially equipped with a thorough knowledge of the
language, the customs, and the people of the country.
It may be asked why, if Persia is already so completely
in her grip, she prefers not to enter into actual posses
sion. The answer is an easy one to those who have
followed Russian policy in other parts of the East.
Russia prefers a feeble and bankrupt Oriental neigh
bour to an annexed dependency. She has learnt the
secret of ruling an Eastern state through its nominal
owners, if only they are weak, corrupt, and in her pay.
It is a device which can be combined with all the ex
ternal forms of respect for existing treaties ; it does not
conflict with the technical maintenance of the status quo;
it spares the susceptibilities of other powers ; it mini
mises the danger of international complications; it
gives a maximum of power with a minimum of respon
sibility.