"مجلد ٤ رقم ١٥ (تاريخي) من دراسات هيئة الأركان البحرية - العمليات البحرية في بلاد بلاد الرافدين والخليج الفارسي" [‎٨‎٢] (١٥٠/١٠١)

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Turkish Government throughout the whole of Arabia. 1 It
would have a wholesome effect on the critical situation in Persia
at that time, where the position of the Germans who were
intriguing against us was entirely dependent on their being
able to keep open the road to Baghdad. It would even re-echo
in Afghanistan.
" If no such effective action be taken, the danger to British
interests in Persia and Afghanistan may be a matter of the
most serious consequence. If we stop short of Baghdad the
political effect of our victorious advance into Mesopotamia will
be largely discounted. The effect of our halting will undoubtedly
be ascribed to weakness." 1
The political officers in Mesopotamia always held the occu
pation of Baghdad in view as the desirable ultimate goal of the
expedition. It might, thought Sir Percy Cox, deter Persia from
declaring war, if carried out in time. 2 '
1 F.O. Memorandum, 7tli October 1915.
2 R. 252 from Sir P. Cox, 29.10.15. Sir P. Cox's views, however, were
not transmitted until six days after the advance to Baghdad had been
authorised.
On 29th October the Admiralty telegraphed to Commodore Wake, S.N.O.,
Persian Gulf (as result of his urgent telegram, No. 40, on the situation) :—
" 15. All preparations should be made for war with Persia. Admi
ralty are informed that additional troops will not be forthcoming
for operations in Persia or for appreciably reinforcing garrisons of
posts, and reliance will consequently be placed on H M. ships taking
as effective steps as possible for protection of British interests . . .
Consult with military and political authorities and report "
Commodore Wake's proposed dispositions are given in the following
telegram, 41, from Commodore, P.Gr., to Admiralty, 31.10.15: —
" After consultation with military and political authorities, I have
arranged that ships will take up the following stations as soon as
possible: Juno, Bushire; Pyramus, Jask; Bramble, Chahbar;
Britomart, Lingeh; Dalhousie, Bander Abbas; Lawrence, Henjam,
if required. As there are not sufficient troops for the occupation of
Lingeh and Bander Abbas, British representatives and subjects will
be removed, if necessary, by ELM. ships at the port to Karachi.
Cable would be disconnected and steamers would cease to call.
Community will remain as long as possible at Chahbar on account
of telegraph line. After evacuating Lingeh and Bander Abbas
DalJiousie will go to Bombay for refit as previously arranged,
Britomart will go to Henjam, from which place a system of relief
ships requiring coal will be arranged. Lawrence will then return to
Bushire for disposal. Defence of Bushire will be undertaken by
Juno and troops, following lines that have been recently in force at
that place.^ C.O. of troops is asking for 400 additional troops to be
sent. This reinforcement is considered very necessary owing to
length of perimeter to defend, 6 miles in length. If it is desired to
sieze Persian seaborne trade propose to form depot for captured
dhows at (? )rag Island, with a second depot, Henjam. It is
considered ports on the Arabian coast need not be considered."