"الملف 73/7 I (D 19) وضع الكويت، سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية في ١٩١١" [و‎‎١‎٢‎٧] (٦٣١/٢٦٧)

[T his QoeaiL'ent is th e Prog ei ■; d His Britannic Majasty
E C3-o¥er imet:t,
eastern department
secret series.
[March 3.J
skotkxk 1
[7880]
No. 1.
India Office to Foreign Office.—{Received March 3.)
Sir
WTrnu £ ' India Office, March 3, 1911-
jr . .. | 1 c ' e '' enc 0 |o your letter of the 20tli January regarding the status of
- < ? Wei ;V aT ?u a Ct e y e Secretary of State for India to forward, for the
.n.». x).(. m.i .ion o ie ^ oci etary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams exchanged
with the Government of India.* ^ &
T • / , tim /V i ^ ie Earl of Crewe concurs in the opinions expressed bv
njiitt ')ant-Colonel Cox and the Government .of India. The necessary conditions
an tceaen /) any concession on the part of His Majesty's Government with regard to
tne status ot Ivoweit appear to him to be:—
T> j 1 '. ' secin ^ n 8" for His Majesty's Government of predominant control in the
Bagdad--ivoweit section of the Bagdad Railway, for which purpose he considers 55 per
cent, ot capital and control inadequate.
o* rp assurance that Koweit will be the terminus.
o. ihe absolute control, jointly with the sheikh, of the harbour and port, both
anoat and ashore.
4. a satisfactory agreement between the sheikh and the Turkish Government as
to the division of customs and transit duties. In return for this, His Majesty's
Government might admit, and advise the sheikh to admit, Turkish suzerainty over
Koweit to the full extent compatible with:—
(a.) The complete autonomy of Koweit in respect of its internal administration,
to be guaranteed by a firman to the sheikh, and confirmed by a written undertaking to
His Majesty's Government, as proposed by Colonel Cox.
(5.) The maintenance of our agreements with the sheikh.
(c.) Fhe recognition by Turkey of Um Kasr, Bubiyan, and Warba as part of
Koweit territory under Turkish suzerainty, and the withdrawal of Turkish guards and
symbols of authority therefrom.
A reasonable settlement of all property disputes, the sheikh taking out Turkish
papers for his son, should also be included in the negotiations; and it would further
be understood that, if the question of tribute is not raised, the sheikh will approach
the division of customs duties, &c., in a liberal spirit.
Whether the Turkish Government will be prepared to negotiate on this basis
will presumably depend largely upon the value which they attach to considerations
mainly of a sentimental order. On the other hand, the concession which His Majesty's
Government are prepared to make, in facilitating the use of Koweit as a terminus for
the Bagdad Railway, is of a very substantial nature ; and in considering what we may
reasonably expect to receive in return it must be borne in mind that the position which
His Majesty's Government have built up for themselves at Koweit, and fortified by formal
agreements with the sheikh, is—together with the similar position which they hold
at Mohammerah—the one solid asset that they possess in those regions, and that they
have been at pains to acquire it precisely for some such purpose as that to which it is
now proposed to put it; while, quite apart from all question of compensation, this
same position makes it impossible for them (as Mr. Marling has pointed out in his
despatch No. 14 of the 4th January last) to abandon the sheikh to the Turks without
such a loss of prestige as would be disastrous to their general policy and interests in the
Persian Gulf. .
For these reasons Lord Crewe would regard the conditions recapitulated above as
essential to a satisfactory settlement. It is clear that in any negotiations that may be
opened great care must be taken to avoid making any admissions with regard to t e
status of Koweit that may be used to our detriment should the whole negotiations
[1932 c—1]
\1