"الملف 73/7 I (D 19) وضع الكويت، سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية في ١٩١١" [ظ‎‎٢‎٢‎٧] (٦٣١/٤٨٨)

47
possible to prevent the imposition of the
op^e)3i r ley n^toscc^y
the Mohanmerah-
Khorremahad line, if we can secure it, tor the extenaon o. our tj^em ^
Persia-the more so as trade by the Baghdad route will, if the nu rtabed Uist >m*
duties are to be the price of British participation, in future be penalised to the
extent of approximately.48,000/ a year.
5 It would appear, therefore, that no commercial advantage is to be antici-
pated' from participation, and Lord Morley is of opinion that, when it is realised
that it is no longer possible for the scctioD to be a predominantly Biitish under
taking, that the British share in it is not likely to exceed at the outside l,000,000i
and that for the privilege of lending this sum to an international company British
trade is to be taxed between 30,000/ and 400,000/ a year, no desire to parti
cipate in it will be found to exist in financial circles m this country. The conclu
sion to which he is driven is that for the present it is desirable on commercial
grounds to stand aloof.
6. Political considerations appear to point in the same direction. His Lord
ship does not overlook the arguments stated in paragraph 10 ot your letter
under reply. But these arguments centre round Kuwait, and it is precisely
Kuwait which—if it is to be the terminus—Turkey cannot afford to give up on the
only terms which we can afford to accept; for alike in the official Turkish proposals,
and in the remarks of Djevad Bey reported in Sir E. Grey's Despatch to^
Sir F. Bertie, No. 20, of 14th instant, it is laid down that the terminus must be
at a place under Turkish administration. While, therefore, Lord Morley, regards
a solution of the Kuwait difficulty as worth the price of considerable concessions,
provided that the conditions stated in my letter of 3rd March are secured, he
is inclined to think that from the Turkish point of view such a solution is neces
sarily inconsistent with the location of the terminus at that place. And if the
terminus is to be elsewhere, Kuwait loses much of its importance, and the price
proposed is far too great to pay.
7. Judging the question, therefore, as Sir E. Grey invites him to do " on
its merits, and apart from the general effect of non-participation on the inter
national situation. Lord Morley holds that the balance inclines markedly to non-
participation, and he concurs in the conclusions indicated in the last two sentences
of Lord Hardinge's telegram.
8. It therefore appears to him that every effort should now be made to
obtain the Mohammerah-Khorremabad concession, and that in the meantime
the Turks should be informed in the friendliest terms that His Majesty's Govern
ment are unable to accept their proposals regarding the railway, and that after
careful examination of the situation (profoundly modified as it has been by the
recent Convention), they have come to the conclusion that the extension of the
line to the Gulf is not worth to them the price which they are asked to mv
and as they do not require the extension in the interests of their own trade'
they do not think it necessary to put forward counter proposals. The fact
that the Company have relinquished their claim to the increased Customs duties
makes it the more easy to adopt this attitude, since the refusal of His Maiesty's
Government to consent to them will nn IfmoAr fi ^ s
to the railway. Lord Morley would propose That Pi. M PI f h0Stility
should then wait and see the efiect of tff commu ^aLf J h
now, as he urged in October last, that the further advance of Turk sh pretensions
at Kuwait and m the Gulf must be resistpd all rv.™ * XUJK ^u. pretensions
it should be given to the Turks to ♦wT'" ^ ^ Wer '. and that
relaxed when British interests are adeauatelv rpcr 'i 1S t ^ on ty be
action in respect of Bahrain reported in Sir G , v ? ew 0 * t* 16 Turkish
25th instant, it seems highly desirable tha^ thi, ^ uV tele g ram ' No - 66 of
earliest possible date, 8 " tbat thls sli0ul(l be ^ clear at the