"F 83 ملف 82/27-II نفط قطر" [و‎‎٢‎١‎٠] (٦٣٠/٤٣٥)

5.
vie^y as at present advised: which was that, so long as the
interests of H.M.G* and of the Sheikh were adequately safeguarded
nothing should "be done which would tend to hamper the conclusion
of an agreement between the Sheikh and the A.P.O.C. in the
immediate future. Delay would inevitably increase the risk that
the Standard Oil Company of California might actively interest
themselves in obtaining the concession. Were they once to enter
the field, they could rely on the active support of the U.S.
Government, and however strong the case on merits for any
special conditions which H.M.G. might be anxious to secure in
respect of British control, British exploitation, British local
representation &c., we should almost certainly find it much more
difficult to have our way on such points when dealing with a
wholly foreign company backed by the U.S. Government than when
dealing with a company such as the Iraq Petroleum Company in
which there was a substantial British element.
The procedure proposed, with an important proviso which
the foreign Office had already recommended to the India Office,
iwould make it possible for the A.P.O.C. to pursue negotiations
immediately with the Sheikh with a view to reaching agreement on
commercial points, - such an agreement to contain no clauses of
apolitical character such as provision for jurisdiction &c.
While those negotiations were in progress, we could separately
discuss with the Company the points to be covered in the proposed
Agreement between the Company and H.M.G. : while the local
political authorities, after consultation with H.M.G. and the
Government of India, could press on with a settlement of the
points in issue between H .M.G, and the Sheikh. The proviso to
^ihich he had referred, and which if accepted should fully
safeguard the special interests of H .M.G., was that a clause
should be inserted in any commercial agreement between the
^P.O.C. and the. Sheikh to the effect that the Agreement could
not/