"ملف 28/7 II الحرب: البروباجاندا - الرأي المحلي" [ظ‎‎١‎٨‎٣] (٦٨٦/٣٦٦)

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Italians hold with certain exceptions the mainland 5 Ionian islands and
the islands of the Aegean. The Germans have reserved for thenselv
vital areas including the Piraeus, Salamis and Salonika and an
around it, the islands of Mytelena, Lemnos and Chios, and most of ur:,;.
Bulgarians occupy eastern Macedonia and most of Greek Thrace.
An Allied invasion of eastern Macedonia and Greek Thrace,
v/here Bulgarian atrocities have earned the loathing of the Greek popu
lation, would be a direct challenge to Bulgaria, v/hich is in a state
of extreme political tension as the result of a series of assassinations
of pro-Nazi officials. There is a good deal of evidence that a vigorous
underground movement against the German alliance and its supporters is
being developed by the Agrarians, Democrats and Communists 0 A direct
Allied threat to Bulgaria might well precipitate a revolution. f, If K ,
writes the Turkish paper 'Vatan 1 , "Bulgaria does not panic, she will be
the first country in Europe to be smashed. It is hard to believe that
Bulgarians will fight against the Allies". Such a move would certainly
be the signal for widespread revolt by guerillas throughout Yugoslavia
and Greece and political tension is hardly less acute in Rumania than
in Bulgaria. For such an enterprise a very strong Allied army could no
doubt be assembled in the Levant or Alexandria, including the Britis>
Ninth and Tenth Armies of the Middle East. The chief impediment woiixa
be that the entrances to the Aegean are guarded by Crete and the
Dodecanese, and its enclosed waters would be very dangerous for large
convoys until the numerous German and Italian airfields on the islands
and the Greek mainland are rendered unusable and Allied air supremacy
has been established. It may be that reconquest of Crete would be a
necessary preliminary, but modern air and sea power combined might make
it possible to neutralize an island outpost vdthout even attacking it
at all with ground forces.
(d) Northern possibilities;
Release of shipping and escort vessels resulting-' from the
command of the short Mediterranean route and the rapid growth of Allied
air power now make it possible to build up Iceland and/or northern
Scotland from defensive bastions into springboards for attack on northern
Norway. Advantages would be; the support of the population, which is
on its toes ready for the word "go" from its liberators; the cutting of
the important iron ore supply route from Narvik to Germany, and direct
contact with the Finns, who, if assured of Anglo-American food supply,
might well decide to abandon the war, with important results for the
Leningrad sector of the Russian front. If such an attack induced the
German fleet to come out, the British Navy would welcome the event with
an enthusiasm similar to that with which they would greet a fleet action
with the Italians in the Mediterranean. The chief points against the
project are the length of a sealine of supply of over 400 miles and the
fact that the invading troops could not at first be given fighter c /er
except from aircraft-carriers.
(e) Fra nce an d I taly;
Another possible form of attack is on the outer defences of
Germany and would be a simultaneous invasion of France from Britain in
the north and Bizerta in the south. The Germans have been making
feverish efforts since last November to fortify the Riviera and the
north coast of France from Calais to Brest, the most heavily defended
section of the West Wall. On the other hand, the Allies could bring
overwhelming sea and air power to bear, and dual thrusts of this sort
would compel the Germans to weaken their whole position by a wide
dispersion of troops and transport.
Finally, there is Italy. Although occupation of Sicily and
Sardinia might appear to be an obvious preliminary, possession of these
islands is not essential for an attack on the Italian mainland. If
they can be temporarily neutralized by overwhelming air and sea power
while the invasion of Italy is taking place, they, like Crete, would
automatically fall in our hands. The extremely powerful air force
under Air Marshal Tedder has already plastered the ports and airfields
of these two islands, and it may not be long before the Luftwaffe and