ملف رقم ٨٩٧ لسنة ١٩١٢، جزء ٢، "الخليج الفارسي:- مكاتب البريد البريطانية" [ظ‎‎٤‎١] (٤٥٦/٨٧)

was a general decrease o[ the area under cultivation and much damage
to trade. c ^
6. In September 1915, it was decided to make a large purchase of mules
and other supplies in South-West Persia for military requirements, and
purchasing officers were sent to Shushtar and I)izful‘ where they worked
under arrangements made by His Majesty’s Vice-Consul at Ahwaz; the
countn was at this time in such a disturbed state that no caravans travelled
unless strongly guarded. The Sagwands wore raiding Ghazban and other
tribes in Aiabistan and Mesopotamia, and vice versa, trade was at a
standstill and the 1 eisian Customs and Revenue Departments could not
collect enough to pay the salaries of their local representatives, much less
finance the Local Government.
J he puK.hase of mules was carried out under circumstances of
considerable difficulty and at a heavy expenditure in blackmail.
7. In hebiuary 191b, a large party of Persian gendarmes, who had
joined the Germans, and lately the Turks in Persia, and had been defeated
by the Russians, then advancing on Karmanshah and Khanikin, endeavoured
to return to their homes in the Bakhtiyari country and Ispahan through
Pusht-i-Kuh. They were intercepted near Dizful by a strong detachment of
our cavalry,^ the majority were killed or captured, and the remainder
dispelsed. I hen leaders, two young Bakhtiyari Khans, were captured, but
were released soon afterwards on representations by the Ilkhani. They
subsequently joined the German Kardorff and took a prominent part against
the Russians and ourselves in Ispahan.
A second party was similarly dealt with shortly afterwards. The
incident had an excellent effect on our prestige in the district, and had a
widespread effect in Luristan and Pusht-i-Kuh.
8. I his phase of the situation was succeeded by less favourable
developments. Kut was captured by the Turks and during the following
months the Russians were forced to evacuate successively Karmanshah and
Hamadan. Ihe situation m Persia gave rise to considerable anxiety,,and
the attitude of the Bakhtiyari Khans became equivocal.
9. In view of our past, experience and having regard to the greatly
increased importance, both to the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force, and to
the Admnalty, of the oil fields it was realised that we could not afford to
usk a return to the status quo m ISiorthern Arabistan. it seemed equallv
cleai that ioi the same reasons the enemy would not again neglect the chance
ol ruining the fields and of threatening our flank, and militarv and political
measures were concerted accordingly.
. . 10. A Political Officer (Mr. E. B. Soane) was sent to Dizful with
instructions to get in touch with the tribes, to prevent enemy agents from
having access to the district, to encourage so far as practicable co-operation
by the Luristan tribes with the Russians, and to take such steps as were
necessary to prevent the local situation from getting out of hand in the
event of the situation in Central Persia turning to our disadvantages, as
seemed at one time very probable. The military authorities were known to
be averse to sending troops to Dizful or Shushtar, but they were none the
less anxious lliat no stone should be left unturned to ensure that, in the
event of further Turkish successes in Central Persia, Northern Arabistan
should not again become a hot-bed of intrigue in which German propaganda
would flourish, with a consequent menace to the fields ; the detachment at
Shush was strengthened and the garrison at'Ahwaz increased.
II. By the early autumn matters had apparently reached a critical stage
in Central Persia, and it seemed likely that the Turks would make a further
considerable advance. The whole situation in Arabistan came under review
on the occasion of the visit of the Commander-in-Chief in India to Basrah,
and after being referred home, it was decided to take steps to provide a