ملف ١٩٠٤/٢٧٦٤ الجزء ٢ "سكة حديد بغداد: مفاوضات عامة ١٩٠٨-١٩١٠." [و‎‎١‎٣‎٢] (٧٩٩/٢٧٢)

IHtT Do( !ggiE:i: i ^ ie Property of His Britanmo Majesty's GorcrajEeatj
BAGDAD RAILWAY.
SECRET.
%
[814] No. 1.
Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—{Received January 8.)
(Secret.)
Si r > 4 Board of Trade, January 7, 1910.
I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your secret
letter of the 29th December, transmitting copy of a letter from Sir E. Cassel with a
memorandum of conversations between Herr von Gwinner and Sir E. Cassel with
respect to the Bagdad Railway.
In their consideration of the proposals made by Herr von Gwinner, the Board have
had the advantage of receiving additional information from Sir IT. Babington Smith;
and they desire me to offer the following observations for the consideration of
Sir E. Grey
1. The Board are strongly of the opinion that the limitation of the British share in
the railway south of Bagdad to 50 per cent, would be insufficient, or at least would be
considered by critics in this country to be insufficient’to secure the undoubted and
complete control by British interests which they regard as essential, and that an effort
should be made to induce the Turkish Government to consent to an extension of the
British share to at least 55 per cent., and if possible to 60 per cent. They understand
that Herr von Grwmner would have no objection to this course. Should the Turkish
Government be unwilling to consent to the proposal, the same end might perhaps be
achieved by transferring the proposed 10 per cent, interest of the Anatolian Railway
to the new National Bank of Turkey, an Ottoman institution with predominant British
control.
2. In view of the considerations urged by Herr von Gwinner, and the fact that the
proposal appears to be acceptable to the British financial interests concerned, there
does not appear to be any objection to the proposed payment to the Bagdad Railway
Company out of the kilometric guarantees of the sum of 2,000L per kilometre. In the
opinion of the Board it w T ould, however, be preferable, if possible, that the subsidy
payable by the Turkish Government in respect of the new line should be reduced by
the agreed amount, and a corresponding increase made in the amount payable by the
Turkish Government to the Bagdad Railway Company in respect of the construction
northward of Bagdad. This would be a matter for arrangement with the Turkish
Government, but it seems desirable that the financial clauses of any agreement which
may be made between the British and German groups should be so worded that, whilst
ensuring that the Bagdad Railway should receive the increased subvention, the channel
through which it should be paid should be left open. Hie adoption of the course
suggested above would avoid giving the impression that, on the one hand, the British
enterprise is insisting on a subvention from the Turkish Government which is
admittedly excessive having regard to the cost of construction of the Persian Gulf
section, and, on the other hand, that it is directly subsidising German enteiprise in
Asia Minor. • -n
3. The Board hope that, in any arrangement made with the German group, it will
he clearly understood that the Germans will raise no objection to a subsequent
agreement between the British group and the Turkish Government foi the vaiiation of
the concession in certain important points, e.g. :
(a) Abrogation of the article in the existing convention which prohibits con
struction southward of Bagdad until the railway has reached that place from the
north;
(6) A variation of the route at present indicated ; and
(c) A variation of the character and gauge of the railway.
4. The Board hope that it may he found possible to arrange that any railway that
maybe made to Khanikin should join the main line at Bagdad itself, and not at a point
further north. , . „ ^ ^ i
If it should be found necessary in order to obtain Russian consent to the proposed
arrangement to agree to Russian construction and control of this branch line, the
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