ملف رقم ٣٤٨ لسنة ١٩١٣ الجزء ٢ "بلاد فارس: شؤون كرمان" [و‎‎١‎١‎٣] (٢٨٤/٢٣٠)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Government,]
PERSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA.
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[February 9.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
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Section: 2 .
[5861]
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No. 1.
Sir TT . Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)
{No. 8. Confidential.)
Sir, Tehran, Januai'y 10, 1914.
I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a Confidential
despatch which I have received from His Majesty’s Consul at Kerman, upon the
subject of the increasing prevalence of Baluchi raids that not only threaten towns
in which there are considerable British carpet weaving interests, but even the city
of Kerman itself.
Captain Lorimer points out with much reason that the situation is fast becoming
an intolerable one when Baluchi raiders not only threaten the Kerman-Bunder Abbas
trade route in large numbers, but even might menace the town of Kerman itself in
the absence of the Governor-General, should that official at a critical moment be
absent with the bulk of his forces in some other part of the province. The remedy
for this unsatisfactory state of things lies, Captain Lorimer appears to think, in
offensive operations into Persian Baluchistan, but he rightly considers that no good
purpose would be served by such an expedition unless the necessary steps were taken
to secure the establishment of a permanent administration in Persian Baluchistan
under a capable Governor, who should be independent of the Governor-General of
Kerman, and be provided with such a military force as would enable him to maintain
order and put a stop to raiding.
Such an arrangement is highly desirable, but Captain Lorimer proceeds to point
out in his despatch all the difficulties that attend the execution of such a plan under
existing conditions. An expedition under a Bakhtiari Governor-General would, he
shows, be of a purely ephemeral nature, with, as its main object, the amassing of as
much plunder as possible by the leader. And yet with a Bakhtiari Governor-General
there is at least some chance that some punitive measures can be undertaken, because
the Bakhtiari khans are always accompanied by a certain military force of their own
tribesmen. Nothing but a purely defensive attitude could be assumed by any other
Governor-General that the Persian Government would be likely to send to Kerman,
because he would have no force, beyond the somewhat unreliable levies he could raise
locally, to oppose to the Baluchi raiders.
The present Governor-General, Serdar Mohtashem Bakhtiari, who has not left
Tehran, has had the Baluch question seriously under consideration in concert with the
Minister of the Interior, and contemplates undertaking a military expedition, on which
he hopes to secure the co-operation of at least a small gendarmerie force, which would,
with his own sowars, provide a backbone for the local troops that he will have to
recruit for the purpose. The Serdar does not, however, propose to trust to the sword
alone, but has already despatched a peace emissary in the person of Misbah-i-Diwan, a
former Governor of Bunder Abbas, to treat with the Baluch leaders, with a view to
reaching, if possible, a compromise that will enable an administration to be established
without fighting. Misbah-i-Diwan claims to enjoy great influence with the Baluch
chiefs, but I much doubt if his diplomatic mission will achieve much useful result.
It is, however, I think, a good sign that an effort should be made to come to a friendly
settlement of a question that is fraught with many difficulties.
I have caused parts of Captain Lorimer’s despatch to be communicated to the
Minister of the Interior, who has informed me, in reply, that he intends, as soon as
such a course may be feasible, to separate Persian Baluchistan from Kerman, and to
send an independent Governor to it, either from Tehran or elsewhere, but his Highness
added that this cannot be done until there is a strong force of gendarmerie in the
province of Kerman. It would be idle to suppose that the small gendarmene foice
now in Kerman will become strong enough to undertake the task of pacifying Peisian
Baluchistan just at present, but from their exploits on the Bushire—Shiiaz load and
elsewhere in Northern Persia, I think we may fairly anticipate that they will icndei a
better account of themselves than Captain Lorimer would appear to anticipate.
As regards the final proposal contained in Captain Lorimer s despatch, namely,
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