بلاد فارس، هراة، وسيستان. [ظ‎‎٨‎١] (٢٨/٦)

and that the Shah was anxious to offer to England
an entire preponderance in his councils, and to
place the whole of his foreign policy under her
guidance if Her Majesty’s Government were ready
to give His Majesty on this occasion a pledge ot
their good will.
« The policy pursued by England, Malcom Jinan
continued, was bringing about the annexation of
Merv by Russia. This was a measure which Persia
could prevent, but to do so she must have the
assistance of England. The first and most obvious
mode of rendering such assistance was by placing
Herat in her hands. With respect to that place, he
observed that Persia had much cause to complain.
She was in possession of it in 1857. England had
gone to war with her to force her to abandon it,
and she had done so by a treaty, by which it was
surrendered to Afghanistan, on the understanding
(which was clearly implied by the words employed)
that Afghanistan was to remain independent. This
independence, Malcom Khan said, we were now
preparing to limit, if not to extinguish, without in
the least consulting Persia. Persia naturally felt
cold and mistrustful of a Power which treated her
in such a manner; but these feelings might be
converted into those of entire attachment if we
would acknowledge the title of Persia to Herat, and
we might demand for that concession whatever con
ditions we pleased.
“ I stated in reply that I was not familiar with
the language of the Treaty of 1857, and could not
on the spur of the moment discuss the point which
he had raised in respect to it. But I said that
Herat was regarded by Indian authorities as a point
of great importance, and that they would look with
misgivings at the occupation of it by a Power which
might not be able entirely to throw off the control
of Russia. I asked him what other ways there
were, besides the cession of Herat, in which we
could strengthen Persia to resist the advance of
Russia.
“Malcom Khan said, ‘II y a mille mani&res,’
but he only specified one,—the provision of money
to enable Persia to obtain more effective armaments.
“He dwelt much on the certainty of Russia
advancing to Merv, if nothing were done to prevent
her, and of the danger to the English position in
India which such an advance would involve. He
assured me that he had a power over the councils
and resolutions of the Shah possessed by none of
His Majesty’s Ministers, and that he could ensure
the acceptance of any conditions I might propose.
He repeated again and again that this was the
critical moment, the point from which the policy of
Persia must definitely turn either towards Russia
or towards England, and that the responsibility
which would rest on Her Majesty’s Government, if
they allowed it to pass by in mere neglect, would
be very great.
“ I replied that the considerations which he had
laid before me were far too grave to admit of an