ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الأول "المحمرة: الوضع. تطمينات بريطانية للشيخ." [و‎‎١‎٥‎٩] (٤١٦/٣٢٢)

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The terms of the Persian “Declaration Additionnelle” to the 1903 Convention
• (viz. (1) that the station to he established at the entrance of the Gulf in accordance
with the Venice Convention of 1897 should be under Persian, and not international,
control; and (’2) that it should be placed on the Island of Henjam, and not Ormuz)
were communicated by the Prench Government to the British Ambassador at Paris
in December 1905, with an intimation that the Persian proposals were favourably
viewed by them. These proposals did not commend themselves to the British
% Government, partly on the ground that any such arrangement would defeat the object
’ of the British reserves, viz., the postponement of the scheme for a station at’the
entrance of the Gulf, and partly because they doubted the ability of the Persian
authorities to provide the necessary funds for the purpose.* In regard to this latter
point, Mr. Grant Duff, writing from Tehran on the 15th November, 1905, said that
he did not think “ there is the slightest prospect of the provisions of the Convention,
or any other sanitary measures, being carried out, except in those ports where the
quarantine arrangements are under European control, so long as Persia remains under
its present Government,” The Prench Government, however, continued to press the ,
point, and in support of the Persian proposals stated that Dr. Paivre (whose Report
His Majesty’s Government had not yet seen) had pronounced in favour of Henjam, ^
the island chosen by the Persian Government, as being a suitable position for the
station, while, at the same time, they pointed out that it would be difficult for them to
explain to Persia that one of the reasons for which Great Britain had decided not to
accept the Persian proposal was the incapacity of the Persian Treasury to bear the
expenses. It was also urged that, if the Persian offer were declined, Persia might
refuse to ratify the Paris Convention or make her ratification conditional on reserves,
which would cause still further delay in bringing the Convention into operation.
At this stage of the discussion Dr. Thomson’s Report reached the hands of His
Majesty’s Government in July 1906. Its general conclusions were opposed to the
creation of a sanitary station at the entrance to the Gulf, (1) because it still remained
to be proved that epidemics had been conveyed to Europe by that route ; (2) because
a sanitary station at that point would be ineffective, inasmuch as it would be evaded
by native sailing craft, the most dangerous class of shipping; and (3) because no
suitable position could be found for such a station, Henjam, though upon the whole
the most suitable site in other respects, being open to serious objections on account
of its climate, its inadequate water supply, and its lack of provisions.
Dr. Thomson’s own recommendations were summarized as follows at the close of
his Report:—
“ In substance, therefore, the scheme best adapted, in the circumstances, to secure a reason
able degree of protection to Europe and the minimum of interference with commercial interests
in the Gulf of Persia consists in the perfecting of the present sanitary stations at Mohammerah
and Bushire,t the establishment of a sanitary station at Koweit, and the creation of a new station
in place of that now existing at Bussorah. Sanitary defence of the Gulf based on these lines will
afford a greater degree of protection to Europe against plague and cholera than would be
secured by a ‘ sentinel station ’ near the entrance of the Gulf, combined with a terminal
station at Bussorah, and will not impose on shipping the unnecessary and prejudicial restrictions
that would result from the latter scheme.
“If thi%,view should meet with acceptance, I would urge that steps should be taken to
pnt the scheme I have suggested in operation with all possible speed. I view the alter native
‘sentinel station' project with apprehension, as calculated to be^ ineffective, expensive, and
gravely detrimental to commercial interests—and these are mainly British m the Gu .
Abandonment of this ‘sentinel station’ project is much more likely to follow on knowledge
that defensive measures, of the kind and at the places I have indicated, are m actual operation
than on mere announcement that such measures are in contemplation.
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Dr. Thomson’s views as to the “ sentinel station were adopted by His Majesty s
Glovernment, and the Erench Government were informed that the Persian proposals
were inacceptable, a decision which was in due course communicated to leisiaanc
to the other parties to the Convention.
* In his despatch of the 27th April, 1906 , to Sir F. Bertie, Sir E. Grey w *'ot e : “ The unsatisfactory
state of Persian finances makes it hard to believe that that country would )e ica y ^
expenditure, and it would seem clearly indicated that she is relying on on suy assis anc ,
scheme may be said to have originated rather in St. Petersburgh than m ienian. p • •
t Dr. Thomson further considered that there would “ be advantage to commerc - Y d PP g
the sanitary station at Bunder Abbas.”
[2878 5—1]
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