ملف رقم ٢١٨٢ لسنة ١٩١٣ الجزء ١١ " الجزيرة العربية: العلاقات مع ابن سعود والنزاع على منطقتي نجد والحجاز" [و‎‎٣‎١‎٦] (٦٧٨/١٨٦)

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Ibn Sam] further regarding a meeting on board ship at Jeddah Port, he would be glad
if definite assurances could be obtained from the Admiralty that a suitable ship could
be made available to visit Hasa and to take Ibn Sand and his entourage to Jeddah.
On the idtli April a telegram was received from Lord Allen by, in which he (E. 3012)
rgneated his conviction that London was the best possible meeting place. 'The repor-ted
sTf^d of the Akhwan movement was dangerous unless Hussein and Ibn Sand were
reconciled without delay. The outlook of both rulers would be materially changed by
a visit to England.
On the 20th April a further telegram was received from Lord Allenby, in which (E. 3490)
he repeated his suggestion that the two rulers should meet in London, and said that
if this view were not adopted, and the meeting were to fall through, he regarded the
situation with much misgiving. It was evident that neither Ibn .Sand nor his followers
were prepared to accept indefinite exclusion from the pilgrimage, and the increasing
strength of the Akhwan movement rendered it probable that they would overrun the
Hejaz with results that would be disastrous to the reputation of His Majesty’s Govern
ment amongst Moslems. 1 he best thing that could be done to prevent this was to
persuade Hussein to allow the Pilgrimage from Nejd on condition that the pilgrims
veie under the control of a headman, guaranteed by Ibn Sand to keep the peace and
to abide by local regulations. Both parties should at the same time be warned of the
serious view His Majesty’s Government would take of any trouble. Lord Allenby
regarded this as a doubtful experiment in the present state of tension, and only put it
forward as it was dangerous to let the matter slide. The only way of bringing about
peace was to reconcile the two parties, and until this was done at a meeting between
them troubles might occur at any time. He agreed that it would be undesirable to
mvite Hussein to London and not Ibn Sand.
.On the 21st April the foreign Office received a copy of a telegram of the 15th (E. 3520)
April from the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, in which he stated that fresh tribes
continued to accept the leadership of I bn Sand, and that the Akhwan movement was
being viewed with increasing complacence in Bahrein and along the TTucial Coast.
He added that the probability of Ibn Sand seizing Mecca w r as being discussed very
frankly in Bahrein, and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf and in Mesopotamia. The
general opinion appeared to be not unfavourable to such a consummation, as it was
believed that this would fie in the interests of religion and would make the Pilgrimage
safer. As far as could be judged, the effect on Mesopotamia of the occupation of
Mecca would not be unfavourable. ft might have a good effect on the Shiah
priesthood.
On the 2Gth April a telegram was received from Lord Allenby in which he (E. 3751)
commented on this telegram from the Civil Commissioner, and inferred that the latter
did not view wdth any great misgiving the reported spread of the Akhwan movement
and the possibility of Ibn Sand overrunning the Hejaz. Lord Allenby trusted that
tins was not the opinion of His Majesty’s Government. The conquest of the Hejaz
would be a very definite blow to British diplomacy and would weaken the position of
His Majesty s Government in the Moslem world. He felt strongly that every effort
should be directed to maintaining Hussein upon his throne, and that if ibn Saud
showed any tendency towards aggression, every possible means should be taken to
prevent him.
Un the 27th April the loreign Office received a letter from the India Office (py 3793 )
enclosing copies of despatches received from Mesopotamia, including the reports of the
Political Agent, Bahrein. The India Office recommended that, in view of shipping
difficulties, the proposal for a meeting between the two rulers should be abandoned,
^ eas ^ autumn. They pointed out, however, that the
tr T ] 1 • re 3 ' ar ding the Pilgrimage this year must be faced at once, and suggested that
His Majesty s Government, while leaving the question of the meeting of the two rulers
to remain in abeyance, should urge both parties, both that the existing truce between
them should be extended for the Haj, and that with mutual assurances of peaceful
behaviour throughout the Pilgrimage on behalf of themselves and their followers, they
should covenant for the reopening of the Pilgrimage.
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