"الكويت، ١٩٠٨-١٩٢٨" [‎١‎٦] (١٤/١٣)

13
'October of that year it was ascertained that the Sheikh of Koweit had
undoubtedly applied through the Sheikh of Mohammerah to be taken under
Persian protection. Mr. Lorimer suggests that this move, which the Sheikh,
it is stated, took no pains to conceal, was perhaps contrived by His Excellency
merely with a view to testing the degree of interest taken in Koweit by His
Majesty s Government. The Sheikh’s advances were, however, in any case
rejected by the Shah.
C.—Summary.
50. In conclusion, it may be remarked that, while the present Sheikh is
far from an outstanding personality, internal conditions in Koweit at the
present time show a marked improvement on the position on the death of
Sheikh Salim in 1921. In August 1920f local feeling was reported to be
running high against Sheikh Salim, owing to the loss of trade resulting from
his quarrel with Ibn Saud, to his general incapacity as a ruler and to his total
lack of tact, and it would appear that a coup d'etat was more than a
possibilityJ had not the Sheikh died at a critical period of the Koweit-Nejd
boundary negotiations on 23rd February 1921. Under the present Sheikh,
while the customs dispute with Nejd remains an open sore and the activity
of the Akhwan a standing menace, matters may on the whole, be said quite
definitely to have improved. The boundary question has been settled and
•on a basis not unsatisfactory from the point of view of Koweit; the question
of British jurisdiction within the Principality has equally been regularised ;
internal conditions are not such as to call for serious animadversion and,
while the Sheikh, as stated above, is not an outstanding personality, he is
not only well disposed towards His Majesty’s Government but, from the point
of view of internal administration, may be regarded as a not inefficient ruler
when judged by Arab standards.
51. On a broad view, the importance of Koweit is less great from the
standpoint of His Majesty’s Government than that of Bahrein or of Muscat;
but its absorption, or the establishment in it of a dominating influence, by Ibn
Saud, could not but react injuriously on the position of His Majesty’s
‘Government alike in Iraq and in Bahrein and along the Trucial Coast.
Hitherto it has been possible to maintain British influence without substantial
interference in the internal affairs of the Principality ; the recent activities
of the Akhwan have led to formal appeals by the Sheikh to the guarantees of
protection which he holds from His Majesty’s Government, and it is to be
hoped that the standing threat to his independence constituted by his
powerful neighbour in Nejd and the effective assistance given him against
the Akhwan during the present year may help to continue to keep him
generally amenable to British influence. The desirability, at the same time,
of securing that the Sheikh shall not escape absorption by Ibn Saud only to
end by absorption in an Iraq, no longer under British mandate, and the
increased importance which his Principality, situated at the head of the
Gulf, will assume as British control decreases in Iraq, cannot be overlooked
in considering the general policy to be adopted in the Principality by His
Majesty’s Government.
D.—Points referred to Persian G-ulf Sub-Committee.
52. The points in connection with Koweit which have been specifically
mentioned in connection with the deliberations of the Persian Gulf Sub-
Oommittee are
(a) Whether the maintenance of the independence of Koweit (as of
Muscat and the Trucial Chiefs) which is constantly threatened by
Ibn Saud, is necessary for British purposes, and, if so, how is it to
be secured ? (P.G. 3 viii, P.G. G (2) c. i.)
(b) The position as between Iraq and Koweit—desirability of keeping
Koweit clear from absorption in Iraq, or from coming under Iraq
influence. (P.G. 6, 2 (6) (3).)
(c) Extent to which His Majesty’s Government should increase or
decrease the interest taken and the control exercised by them
in Koweit. (P.G. 6, 2 (c) 5.)
t Tel. from C.C. to S. of S.
for L, 10452, Aug. 29 1920,
P. 6499/20.
+ C%j. tel. from H.C.,
Baghdad, to S. of S. for I.,
Jan. 29 1921, P. 692/21.
Major More’s Report:
Article on Hamad Bin
Abdullah-as-Sagar.
Major More’s Report,
passim.