ملف رقم ٦٠٠ لسنة ١٩٠٥ الجزء ٣ "المنطقة الداخلية لعدن: الوضع؛ انسحاب الوكيل السياسي من الضالع؛ معاهدات مع زعماء قبائل الحواشب والقُتيبي والعلوي" [و‎‎٢‎٠‎٢] (٥٠٨/٣٩٩)

27
near the Turkish border hns compelled me
now it appears I cao intervene no longer, but
of all my schemes.
to interfere up to this dete, and
must witness the breaking up
# The Amir holds a dozen letters from me warning him of the futility of
DeS g er U 1906 r War^l0rS • (See notes of his i^erview with me on 4th
This piece of Amiri reasoning should he noted !
I told the Amir when I concluded the former three months, truce that if, hv
its close the Shams still rejected the “ Sharia(to which all good Moslems are
supposed to appeal to settle their differences), he might tahe his own measure
and I would assist him if he was powerless to do anything. My assistance was
of course only moral. As the truce was being concluded and discussed, and also
shortly after its conclusion, the Amir’s people continued their pin-pricks, nor
would he, till some time after, proclaim the truce in his markets—a circum
stance which greatly exasperated the Shairis and considerably lessened the
probability of their submitting to the Moslem “ Sharia.” After this the history
is well known. He implored me to intercede and at once concocted repressive
schemes to coerce the Shairis, forfeiting thereby, as I told him, all claims on
my assistance and intervention. Added to this, were the Eesident’s instruc
tions to leave the Amir to settle his affairs unaided.
H. F. JACOB.
II.
Dthata,
Saturday, 6th January 1907.
The Amir called, very dejected, to see me and with him the intermediary
Saleh “ Ubi-yed al Yameni from Sultan Ahmad Fadthl with Sultan Maudtha
Saif of Lower Yafa.” I told him that in terms of his letter “ P ”, in which he
asked me not to interfere, I was one with him, and although I had written
him yesterday that if he disturbed the peace of the country-side by attacking
the Shairis (and thereby drawing in a multitude of others including the
Kotaibis), I would stop the fight by force, yet now, if he longed to fight and
had brought his hordes (withal contrary to my advice) to Dthala, he was at
liberty to do so as he, the Amir of the country, thought best in the circum
stances. One thing I would tell him, viz., that Government did not look
approvingly on the devastation of the Shairi country and the abasement of its
people, and so, if he elected to fight, Government would not give him assistance
either in men or ammunition. He must work out his own salvation The Amir
and party pleaded the enormous expenses that would fall on his exchequer if he
had to dismiss his forces at this stage. I replied that he had brought them up
contrary to my orders and advice and, though I sympathised with him in his
losses, the blame attached to him and him only. Again, I did not any longer
insist on his breaking them up but only counselled him on lines similar to those
already pressed on him, viz., to desist from massing his forces in Dthala so long
as we remained in the country. If he so wished, and he did not believe the
Shairis would acquiesce in submission to him as father, I hereby gave him carte
blanche to use his men, though not in the vicinity of our camps (when we
should be obliged to ward off any possible danger to ourselves) and without our
assistance. He was asking for" my counsel rather late in the day, and it was a
pity he had not listened to my advice before.
The Amir and party then begged me to take ten hostages from both sides—
the Shairi ten to be sent to Aden. I asked him what were the precise terms on
which he would have me intervene, for he had mentioned a document between
the late Amir " Ali Mukbil and the Shairis which laid down their respective
rights and duties. The Amir should shew me this document before I approached
the Shairis, as I could not offer them terms when I was in the dark as to the