"ملخص لعلاقات الحكومة البريطانية مع قبائل وشيوخ عربستان. بقلم الملازم أ. ت. ويلسون، القائم بأعمال القنصل في عربستان" [و‎‎٢‎٥] (١٤٣/٥٤)

35
guarantee his independence. Our Government does not, I imagine, contem
plate such a contingency, but we can tell him that we regard him as the most
influential person in this part of the world, and that we intend as far as possible
to suppoit him, believing that it is for the interest of the country that he
should be strong. If ever he wants our advice he will get it. In return we
expect lie will help us in matters of trade and the like. As to the withdrawal
of the Customs from Mohammerah, I will do all I can to help him. He may
lel^y on oui hearty good will at all times, and upon our help whenever we can
give it without ill-faith to the Persian Government.
Sir H. M. Durand did not meet the Shaikh, but returned from Nasiri via
Dizful and Luristan to Tehran. He, however, sent him the Royal Victoria
Medal which the Shaikh accepted, having first obtained pennission from the
Central Government to do so. 1
In August 1901, a telegram was received by the Shaikh from the Gover
nor-General of Luristan and Arabistan at Hurujird, ordering him to make
over the management of the Imperial Customs to Imperial officials, but the
Shaikh, representing that scarcity prevailed and that popular feeling was
unsettled, succeeded in obtaining a respite, nominally of five months. 0 The
delay brought into evidence the forces ranged on either side. On the one
hand the Khans of Dashtistan near Bushire were said to have assured the
Shaikh of their support, if he resisted the Customs by force, and the Bakh-
tiari Khans, on whose help the Persian Government were believed to rely in
case coercion of the Sheikh became necessary, declared that they would not
lend themselves to any such policy, and even professed their greatest friendli
ness for the threatened Shaikh. On the other hand, the Russians, who had
begun to interest themselves in Mohammerah affairs urged the Persian Gov
ernment in the interests of equality of trade to bring the Customs arrange
ments at Mohammerah into line with those already established elsewhere.
Shaikh Khaz al, after some deliberation, proceeded to negotiate, as Sir
A. Hardinge had counselled from an early stage of the difficulty. He des
patched Haji Rais to Tehran, and thanks largely to that astute individual’s
tact and diplomatic skill, succeeded in effecting a compromise which to a very
large extent safeguarded his interests. The nature of this compromise, and
the means whereby it was effected are described in Chapter V.
It included the grant to the Shaikh of three farmans, whereby the Shaikh
was recognised as the owner, with his tribes, of (1) Mohammerah, ’Abbadan
Island, the lands on the bank of the Bahmanshlr river, and the “ Karun ”(t.e.,
the banks of that river up to Ismailiveh), (2) Fallahiyeh, (3) Hindijan and
Deh Mulla, and the lands east of the Karun (but excluding the Jarrahi
district).
Copies of these farmans appear as appendices 7, 8 and 9 to this volume.
The Persian Government at once proceeded to take advantage of the
understanding, and on the 23rd September 1902 the Customs passed under
Imperial control with results temporarily injurious to British commerce. It
may be observed that the Persian Government, unaware of the evidence pos
sessed by the British Government, subsequently denied the existence of an
“ agreement ” between themselves and their subject the Shaikh of Moham
merah.
Before the conclusion of the negotiations between the Shaikh and the
Shah, and for some time afterwards, the situation was fraught with anxiety
to the British Minister at Tehran. A visit of Prince Dabija, the Russian
Consul at Ispahan, to Mohammerah had exposed the Shaikh to direct Russian
intimidation and it is believed that Russian blandishments and threats were
subsequently exercised on his envoy at the Capital, with a view to bringing
about a veiled Russian protectorate over Mohammerah. At one time Shaikh
Khaz’al appeared to waver, and Sir A. Hardinge feared that unless a fuller
measure of confidence in the British Government could be instilled into his
mind, Russian influence would soon be found supreme and active at Moham
merah. The Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, supported the Minister’s view
that an explicit assurance was necessarv, and at length in December 1902
Lord Lansdowne authorised Sir A. Hardinge to communicate to the Shaikh
1 After consultation with H. M/s Minister, the Shaikh did not ask for this permission in the case of his K C T ,E
n 1910,
F 2.