ملف رقم ٢١٨٢ لسنة ١٩١٣، الجزء ١ "الخليج الفارسي، الوضع في قطر، السياسة تجاه ابن سعود" [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎٩] (٣١٨/٢٢٥)

hope that such alliances fg^^^w^ile^fferablTto hold his own against
exploited to the ^most by the Tu,Us Whtle . ons among th h
Ibn Rashid or other Rulers an g, ss i st his enemies would probably
aware that the addition of Turk P d • either to ask for British protection
be his undoing. Consequently he was^dnven and to other shaikh as a
of some such kind as we ha t i his own sword and providence.
Lit o! Old friendships and-U'onsorto t ru sm Hasa P and Ka . f
He was determined by diplomacy, it would be done by resort to
and if it could not be manag ^ l J. tuni than t h e present but before
arms. He could foresee no t £ P obta ; n SO me idea of what attitude we
proceeding to extrernne^ [ wld him at once that [f he did proceed against Hasa,
should take up. rprtainlv not endanger our relations with Turkey on
I was sure that we should ce y disputed the Turkish position m
his behalf for we had n f ^"LTdlv do so when or after he had
Hasa and he must know that we “^ ^gd attack . Of course it might be
brought the matter to a head by a ^ ^ time being since they did not
possible for him t0 ®! ec ison but it wou id probably mean a severe fight and
maintain a very larg g wo uld be the subsequent course of events,
then he had to ^^T^hIL wo^ inevitably"bring retaliation which
Any action on his part a & a Yemen and finally might
mi g y ht develope mto a -r like hat «f course of which he would lose
lead to a further T^f/^Veling the fact that he would be trying conclu-
all he now held. 1 here was > If It exerted itself, crush him utterly and
sions with a world• ™ ' C ^ t erp r ise of which every possible advantage was far
t °. ,lne tedbTthe Livy risk almost amounting to certainty, of his losing all that
outweighed by the hea g . - ’ f • d [ cou id not let him labour under so serious a
he now possessed. As his tnenui co^ course of the Balkan war
3 to e wal°ran 0 t it and thought might be unpalatable it was as well he should
know^ how we regarded the matter.
o From al i t bat l heard in his camp I have no doubt that some day an
attemot will certainly be made on Hasa and Katif, most discussions pointing o
fhe^fact that the Arabs despised the Turkish troops of the garrisons as qui e
useless that they were certain of their immediate success and were mainly
* a fr. Vioto it mip'llt be brought about in the most complete, and if
SStSte» »»<.«» >i“>; ••S '"-*«' “
British sympathy. 1 felt it necessary to point out what seemed to me t
inevitable viz., severe reprisals from the Turks and the absence of interference
on our part in ihe As-Saud cause, and did so whenever the sublet came up.
o There is no doubt that the Arabs of nearly all Arabia have now come to
despise the Turks so much that they consider themselves quite able to deal with
them • for this collapse of prestige the two wars are responsible while distrust
f and contempt for the Turks has been intensified by the exposure, which every
°dL becomes" lainec. that so-called victories were only falsehoods deUberately
circulated by the Government to cover their own failures and weakness. Fhe
unrest and desire for emancipation from Turkish rule .s not confined to Ne]d.
The press contains accounts of similar movements for self-government m Syria,
Bevrout, Baghdad and Basrah, in Basrah 1 am informed that the new Wall on
hi/arrival a few days ago was bluntly told that unless he fell into hue with local
notables he had better re-embark at once for Constantinople.
IO l venture to submit this report in the hope that serious attention may
be directed to “ Bin Saud ” and Central Arabian affairs. The man is a ruler ot
the best Arab type and his personally is one which is likely to lead Arabia should
any extensive combination come into being among its tribes, an event which to me
seems exceedingly probable in the near future, unless some radical change takes
place in Turkish policy towards the Arabs. As soon as some such combination
occurs and perhaps even before, I do not think that there is the least dou t a
Bin Saud’s” first move will be on Hasa and Katif, and when . PP 6 / 18 1
seems to me that we shall be forced into relations with the Amir of Nejd, how
ever much we may desire to avoid them. At present he is most friendly and
inclined even to bind himself in some degree, for he has already expressed as