"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [و‎‎٥‎٣] (٢٤٨/١٠٥)

PART XL—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT 103
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.
C. Relations between the Secretary of State and the Governor-General and
THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNCILS. PRIVATE TELEGRAMS.
outset been taken into the full confidence of the Viceroy as regards the Mesopotamia
Expedition, they would have been able to have afforded prompt and material assistance
in problems, which for want of that aid and experience w T ere allowed to drift until they
temporarily became almost insoluble.
29. Another paper was presented to us containing correspondence relating to the
treatment of the sick and wounded in Mesopotamia. In that paper Mr. Chamberlain,
Secretary of State for India, shows a most commendable solicitude as regards the condition
of the wounded, and from October, 1915, onwards, he repeatedly, urged upon the Viceroy
the advisability of a prompt and special enquiry as to what was actually the condition
of things in Mesopotamia. All these communications were made in private letters and
telegrams, and the correspondence continued for some months until Lord Hardinge in
February made the announcement to which we have previously alluded, that he had
“ at last succeeded in convincing the military authorities that the medical arrangements
up the Tigris are as bad as can be.” In the whole of this paper upon this subject there
was not to be found a single official despatch.
30. If the old practice of having recourse to an official despatch had been adopted,
and a despatch had been written at the outset with the full authority of the Secretary of
State in Council, conveying to the Governor-General the rumours and the nature of the
doubts which had arisen as regards the condition of wounded, and such despatch had been
received by the Governor-General in Council, the circulation of such despatch amongst
both Councils would have accelerated an investigation and prevented a great deal of the
distress and suffering which occurred during that period.
31. We have dealt at some length with this matter. We consider it necessary that the
attention both of the Government and Parliament should be called to the change we have
thus shown to have taken place in the procedure of the two branches of the Indian Govern
ment. If the Government and Parliament are of opinion that these private personal
telegrams and letters are in the future to become a recognised channel of authoritative and
mandatory communication, then the Act of Parliament should be so altered.
32. As the Council of the Governor-General was not consulted, it is clear they cannot
be held responsible for what occurred in the Mesopotamian campaign. On the Viceroy
and the Commander-in-Chief must rest the sole responsibility for advice given and action
taken, so far as India is concerned. But the exclusion of the Ordinary Members of Council
from a knowledge of and touch with the varying fortunes of the expedition circumscribed
the sources, from which information might have been obtained upon the condition of the
army in Mesopotamia.
33. Though the organised manufacturing and industrial resources of India are small
in comparison with its enormous population, still there are a number of capable civil
managers, engineering experts and establishments which could have been useful in dealing
with the difficulties of the Mesopotamia Expedition, if their advice or assistance had
been sought in the manner and on the lines in which outside experience has been
brought to the help of the military establishments in Great Britain. But the intense
centralisation and isolation of the bureaucracy in India was a serious obstacle to such co
operation, for the management of the campaign was that of a close corporation in the sole
charge of two over-worked officials. In this sense the exclusion of the civil members of
the Viceroy’s Council from all responsibility for, or participation in the fortunes of the
expedition had a mischievous and contracting influence in the mobilization of exceptional
outside experience to overcome difficulties, which from their novelty were beyond ordinary
military knowledge and training.
D. Atmosphere of Economy up to Date of War and Effect upon Military
Preparations in India.
34. The control of the expedition under the conditions, which we have
explained, is narrowed down to control by two high officials, both heavily charged with
many other anxious and pressing duties, and both permanently stationed in localities,
which had little, if any, private or personal touch with the forces campaigning in Mesopo
tamia. Although the Viceroy paid a short visit to Mesopotamia early in 1915, yet in the